Friedrich Schlegel and the Idea of Fragment:
A Contribution to Romantic Aesthetics

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Influenced by Chamfort’s Maximes et Pensées (1795) and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, Friedrich Schlegel (1772-1832)[1] was particularly fond of fragments[2]. “Many works of the ancients have become fragments. Many works of the moderns are fragments at the time of their origin” (vol. 2, p. 169; AF 24). This 1798 fragment suggests that, as a “modern,” Schlegel consciously employs the fragment style. However, any consideration of Schlegel solely as an author of fragments would certainly be a limited viewpoint.

Schlegel, especially in his later years, published many systematic lectures. “My work [thus far] in the fields of literature, literary art history, and literary criticism, as it has involved excessively diverse and various matters, has remained entirely fragmentary. Thus, for some time now, I have wished to give a systematic summary” (vol. 6, p. 6).

As this passage from Schlegel’s 1812 Lectures on the History of Literature, Ancient and Modern (published in 1815) suggests, his activities had clearly moved away from the fragment and toward the system. Nevertheless, despite this transition, something in Schlegel remained that could be called the “spirit [Geist] of fragment,” underpinning his systems work as well. That is, the fragment is not a single genre; it is, in fact, the guiding principle behind Schlegel’s thinking. Therefore, it is the fragment that may provide us with some insight into the essence of Romantic aesthetics[3]. This paper will examine Schlegel’s writings from 1795 to 1804 in order to show the modernity of Romantic aesthetics[4].

1. Antiquity vs. Modernity within Fragments

To characterize Schlegel’s theory about the fragment, let us first consider a sample of his early work, On the Study of Greek Poetry, which he penned in 1795. Although Schlegel’s earlier view of the “fragment,” which is discussed therein, differs from the view he would later take on the “fragment” (as expressed during his Romantic era beginning in 1797), it nonetheless lays the groundwork for his later stance.

According to young Schlegel, ancient literature, characterized by “completeness” and “whole beauty,” eventually collapsed into fragments, and thus modern literature was formed. Schlegel cited the late Greek poetry, also referred to as Alexandrian poetry, as evidence of this literary disintegration in ancient Greece. Schlegel writes:

Instead of a perfect organization and a living, unified whole, these pathetic efforts are just patched together out of sundered fragments. They contain only a few beautiful traits, yet they possess no complete and whole beauty (vol. 1, p. 284)[5].
In that statement, we can detect an awareness that defines Schlegel’s later thought: the insight that not only the modern works, consisting of their patchwork of fragments, but, with the collapse of the ancient world, the works of the ancients also broke apart and thus were handed down to the modern world as mere fragments. Within this context, the above fragment, written by Schlegel in 1798, can be understood: “Many works of the ancients have become fragments. Many works of the moderns are fragments at the time of their origin.”

Nonetheless, it must not be overlooked that Schlegel’s early belief about fragments (from 1795) clearly differs from his later viewpoint. In 1795, Schlegel claimed that fragments into which “a whole, complete in itself,” had been torn (abgerissen)” (pp. 284, 295, 342)[6] are nothing but a kind of chaos without any organic unity. Schlegel writes, “One could call it a chaos of everything sublime, beautiful, and charming, which – just like the Chaos[7] of old out of which, according to legend[8], the world emerged – waits a love and hatred in order to separate the different parts and to unify the similar parts” (p. 224)[9]. Here, perfection and fragment and, alternatively, oneness and chaos are used as diametric opposites. Because nothing in the modern world is more than a mere fragment, Schlegel’s ideal of the “whole,” which he supposes only in ancient literature (and literature of the future), has no existence in reality. Thus, in anticipation of our following discussion, it was this rejection of these dualities that gave birth to Schlegel’s identity as a Romantic theorist.

2. Gotthold Ephraim Lessing as a Fragmentist

Schlegel’s denial of the dualities of perfection and fragment, and oneness and chaos, surely signals an implicit paradox. In 1797, Schlegel observes:

Many works, whose beautiful concatenations are praised by many people, have less unity than a hodgepodge of ideas [ein bunter Haufen von Einfällen] that, animated by a spirit of spirit [Geist eines Geistes], aspire for one aim. What binds these ideas together is . . . an unconditionally social spirit (vol. 2, p. 159; L 103).

That is, Schlegel posits, works that appear to possess unity at a glance in fact do so only superficially and, in the negative sense, fail to be more than a mere fragment[10]. Yet it is precisely this “hodgepodge of ideas” that possesses a certain unity if indeed there exists a “Geist eines Geistes” or “social spirit.” Defying common sense, Schlegel continues as follows: “In contrast to these works, artifacts whose connectivity can be doubted by none are, as the artist himself fully understands, not a work at all, but only a fragment – or many fragments, assemblies, or dispositions” (ibid). Here, Schlegel inverts his argument, claiming that artifacts truly equipped with oneness are not the “works” reckoned to possess it, but rather fragments. The connectivity evidenced in such artifacts is to be created dynamically, so to speak, based on some suggestions that are “savingly found here and there” (ibid).

When Schlegel speaks in this paradoxical manner, he is certainly evoking another author, namely Lessing[11]. In Schlegel’s essay, On Lessing, also written in 1797, Schlegel opines: “The most interesting and the most penetrating in Lessing’s works is intimation and suggestion [Winke und Andeutungen]; that which is the ripest and the most complete in his works are
fragments of fragments. . . . His accurate reasoning is generally little more than a string of witty[12] ideas” (vol. 2, p. 112). The position taken in this 1797 passage, which displays the essence of Schlegelian paradoxical thought, clearly differs from the dualistic position seen in On the Study of Greek Poetry in 1795.

How shall we interpret this paradox? The fragment can be termed “ripe[] and ... complete” because of its functions of intimation and suggestion. In fact, Schlegel criticizes those who “fix fragment and ferment[13] and exalt them as the Holy Scriptures, without understanding Lessing’s idea of fragment” (vol. 2, pp. 107-108). If fermented, fragments can give birth to something new. Therefore, to adhere to a fragment, one given as a fact, betrays the Geist or spirit. Later, in 1799, Schlegel writes: “A fragment is a thought that is determined by itself and determines itself” (vol. 18, p. 305; No. 1333). That is, a fragment is that dynamic process of thinking that is both self-defined and simultaneously defining itself.

3. Projects as Fragments from the Future

To further illuminate this view of the fragment, let us now examine Athenaeum Fragment 22, which Schlegel penned in 1798:

A project is the subjective germ of a developing object. A perfect project should be simultaneously entirely subjective and entirely objective – an indivisible and living individual. As to its origin, it should be entirely subjective, original, and possible only in this mind; as to its character, it should be entirely objective, physical, and morally necessary. The sense for projects – projects could be called fragments from the future [Fragmente aus der Zukunft] – differs from the sense for fragments from the past only in direction, progressive in the former and regressive in the latter. What matters is the ability to simultaneously idealize and realize things immediately, to complete them and carry them out partly within oneself. Since the word “transcendental” refers precisely to the connection and separation of the ideal and the real, one could easily say that the sense for fragments and projects is the transcendental part of the historical spirit (vol. 2, AF 22).

Schlegel begins by addressing “projects,” which can also be called plans. A plan must be conceived by a planner. In that way, a plan is inherently subjective. However, a plan must come to fruition in the future or it will not become a project. Thus, a project is not simply subjective; it is at the same time objective (or it must become so). Due to its ability to evolve and its totality, the project is referred to as “an indivisible and living individual.” What is important here is the process by which the project begins as a “subjective germ” and ultimately blooms into an objective reality.

Next, Schlegel compares the “project” to the “fragment.” It can be helpful here to recall that ancient sculpture moving through time is an exemplar of the fragment. Schlegel claimed that the “sense for projects” and the “sense for fragments” are essentially the same. Just as the project is a starting point for the planner, the fragment is something provided to its viewer. Whereas the project is designed to realize a certain goal, the fragment is a remnant of a former whole. Thus, as the planner realizes the project, the fragment’s viewer completes what is
incomplete through imagination. In Schlegel’s view, the process of starting with a part and then completing what is no longer whole can be apparent in both the project and the fragment. In fact, Schlegel posits that the difference between the two is simply one of direction[14]. Consequently, not only the project, but also the fragment, must be an “indivisible and living individual”[15].

Clearly, the project and the fragment are each characterized by an intersection of what is present and what is absent, of the real and the ideal, and of completing (or realizing) objectively and accomplishing (or idealizing) subjectively what is incomplete. In the sense that neither the project nor the fragment is either purely subjective or objective, but rather a nexus between the two poles, the project and the fragment are referred to as “transcendental”[16].

Athenaeum Fragment 238, written in 1798, is germane to this discussion:

There is a kind of poetry whose essence lies in the relation between the ideal and the real, and which therefore, by analogy to philosophical jargon, should be called transcendental poetry [Transzendentalpoesie]. . . . But just as we wouldn’t think much of an uncritical transcendental philosophy that doesn’t represent what is producing [das Produzierende] along with what is produced [das Produkt] and contain at the same time within the system of transcendental thoughts a description of transcendental thinking; . . . in all its descriptions, this poetry should describe itself, and always be simultaneously poetry and the poetry of poetry (vol. 2, p. 204; AF 238).

That is, transcendental poetry is possible only when it is simultaneously realistic in its description of an object and idealistic in describing the process of description itself. Further, the transcendence of such poetry lies in an autopoietic (i.e., self-referential and self-sustaining) process: “Transcendental poetry must be exponentiated infinitely and analyzed infinitely [unendlich potenziert und unendlich analysiert]” (vol. 16, p. 154; No. 804). As this fragment (1797-98) clearly demonstrates, when Schlegel defines transcendental poetry as “the poetry of poetry,” he signifies that the poetry is located within a dynamic process where those objects realistically described allude to the act of description that is not described directly and, conversely, the subjective act of description is itself realized as the object described. Thus, as we have already discussed, the fragment is characterized by this intersection of the subjective and the objective. In this way, we can state that poetry is essentially fragments.

4. Criticism and Fragment

Schlegel, who defined projects as “fragments from the future,” often regarded “fragments” and “projects” as synonyms. Schlegel opines: “All that is divine in [Gottfried] Leibniz is critical instinct, or projects and fragments. . . . All is fragments of infinity” (vol. 18, p. 47; No. 285)[17]. As this 1798 fragment suggests, it is the act of criticism that relates fragments to infinity. In another fragment written in the same year, Schlegel remarks: “To criticize a man is to define his fragments and his projects” (vol. 18, p. 48; No. 299). Following this, we may even argue that criticism takes a fragment in order to “complete [it] and carry [it] out partly within oneself” (vol. 2, p. 169; AF 22). In his 1797-98 fragments, Schlegel states that “[c]riticism is fundamen-
tally a comparison of a work’s spirit and its letter[18] and, in this process, the work itself is to
be handled as infinite, i.e., namely as an absolute and as an individual” (vol. 16, p. 168; No.
992), and that “[c]riticism compares the work with its own ideal” (vol. 16, p. 179; No. 1149).
Schlegel’s definition of the “transcendental” in the Athenaeum Fragment 22 is based upon “the
connection and separation of the ideal and the real”[19].

Two introductory essays by Schlegel in his edition of Gotthold Lessing’s works, “On the
Essence of Criticism” and “On the Combinatory Spirit” (1804) most elaborately express
Schlegel’s theory of criticism:

Criticism must be considered as a bridge between history and philosophy – it connects the
two, which then consolidate into a new, third object. Everyone can recognize that, in the
absence of philosophical spirit, criticism cannot succeed. Likewise, it cannot succeed
without historical knowledge (vol. 3, p. 60).

Functioning as a bridge between history and philosophy, criticism “characterizes” its
object in the following two ways: (1) either presupposing an object and its historical develop-
ment in searching for a concept that can explain it theoretically; or (2) conversely, legitimizing
this concept by showing its historical development “from the first origin to the last comple-
tion,” i.e., the “innate history of the concept” (ibid). That is, criticism is a two-way activity,
moving from history to philosophy or vice versa. In either case, criticism does not address a
timeless and abstract concept; rather, criticism grasps a concept in its “innate history.” Seen in
this way, the fragment quoted above, “To criticize a man is to define his fragments and his
projects” (vol. 18, p. 48; No. 299), should also come into focus. Specifically, criticism of an
individual is nothing more than viewing that person’s “generation” from “the first origin to the
last completion.”

Nevertheless, history is intrinsically open. In the context of the fragment we are currently
examining, what should be criticized is not one’s past, but one’s “projects” or that which ought
to be accomplished. In this sense, we can say that “criticism” does not address only the past,
but rather it must inherently address the ideal future. Thus, in 1804, when Schlegel proposes a
new kind of literary criticism that is essentially different from the conventional model focused
upon past literature, he writes the following: “Criticism should not limit itself to commentaries
on extant, complete, developed literature, but function as an organ (or tool) of literature yet to
come. As an organ of literature, criticism does not merely explain and maintain existing litera-
ture, but is itself productive – at least indirectly, by means of guidance, order and evocation”
(vol. 8, p. 82). Such criticism is here referred to as “productive” because it anticipates a perfect
whole through employing imagination and thereby such criticism contributes to realizing
complementary parts of the whole.

However, Schlegel realizes that the act of criticism itself in completing fragments must
also remain incomplete and fragmentary. With regard to the “inevitable imperfection” that
accompanies the historical knowledge of literature, Schlegel claims in his Conversation on
Poetry (1800):

It is not possible to understand one part by itself [in the history of art]; that is, it is foolish
to wish to consider it only in isolation. The whole, however, is not yet concluded, and, therefore, all knowledge of this kind remains only approximation and *piecework*. Yet we must not and cannot completely give up the striving for it, since this approximation, this *piecework* is an essential component in the development of the artist (vol. 2, p. 340; italics for emphasis).

Here, Schlegel has rendered historically dynamic the hermeneutic circle in between the whole and the parts. The activity of producing a correlation between the whole and the parts – that is, criticism in the Schlegelian sense – consists of two inseparable activities. First, based on an existing imperfect (i.e., fragmentary) whole, criticism imagines the ideal and perfect whole; secondly, anticipating this ideal whole, criticism realizes suitable parts. Yet, because history can never be completed, even criticism that forms “the transcendental part of the historical spirit” (vol. 2, p. 169; No. 22) is intrinsically “piecework.” In this way, criticism that takes up the fragment is, while inevitably fragmented itself, thus integrated into an infinite activity. “The principle for criticism must itself be critical, so that criticism can construct itself” (vol. 18, p. 294; No. 1182). It is precisely criticism’s capacity to self-construct that enables criticism itself to function as another fragment of the infinite[20].

5. Fragment as a Formless Form

In Athenaeum Fragment 206, Schlegel writes, “A fragment, like a miniature work of art, has to be entirely isolated from the surrounding world and be complete in itself like a porcupine” (vol. 2, p. 197; AF 206). However, by referring to the fragment as “complete in itself,” Schlegel is not implying that the fragment has no external relationships. Rather, the fragment’s self-contained essence should actually suggest that, as an individual, the fragment can carry infinite possible definitions. This suggestion gains us entry to further probe into the form peculiar to the fragment.

Again, let us examine Schlegel’s 1804 treatises on Lessing. Schlegel, who believes that Lessing is essentially a writer of fragments, defines the characteristics of Lessing’s fragments as follows:

What are these fragments? What is it that gives them such a high value? To which power of the spirit do they particularly belong? To what extent can they be regarded, though fragments, as a whole? If we do not look to each fragment cowardly, but the mass and the spirit of the whole, we may boldly say: the spirit that rules in them is wit (vol. 3, p. 81).

Here Schlegel is focusing his attention on “wit” as a formative principle that assembles a mass of fragments into a single whole.

Lessing, in his own work, critiqued a number of prejudices held at that time. Nonetheless, according to Schlegel, what was essential in Lessing’s work was not only “content.” “In Lessing’s work and thought,” Schlegel wrote, “it is not only by means of the content itself, but also by means of the form that Lessing provokes us to think for ourselves” (vol. 3, pp. 47-48).
In this way, what Schlegel values most in Lessing’s work is the form’s ability to induce readers to think for themselves[21].

Schlegel recognizes that Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s “theory of science” [Wissenschaftslehre] brought about the “discovery and rebirth” of the “first principle” of philosophy. Schlegel acknowledges that as far as “content” is concerned, Fichte’s philosophy is the most valid. Nevertheless, rigid Fichtean methodology that sought to deduce everything from the first principle, precisely because of its rigidity, actually obstructs understanding (p. 47). Regardless, according to Schlegel, “philosophy” exists primarily “not to teach various thoughts, but to teach to think”[22]. That is, philosophy must “not transmit that which has been conceived, but teach conception by expressing its creation and formation to others” (p. 48). Philosophy is “transcendental” in the sense that it “represent[s] what is producing along with what is produced” (vol. 2, p. 204; AF 238). Philosophy is also “critical” because it addresses an issue from the “first origin to the last completion” (vol. 3, p. 60). According to Schlegel, the best means for transmitting such philosophy is Lessing’s fragmentary form. Thus, Schlegel writes that a synthesis of Fichte and Lessing is needed here: “The true philosophical style is the synthesis of Fichte’s method and fragments” (vol. 18, p. 497; No. 255. Emphasis is original). In a fragment written between 1797 and 1798, Schlegel clearly states: “Even the largest system is only a fragment” (vol. 16, p. 163; No. 930). At first glance, this passage seems simply to mock the system he has just described. However, if we refer back to Schlegel’s above remarks on Lessing, we can parse out Schlegel’s meaning: A system can be a true system only when it is simultaneously a fragment. In Athenaeum Fragment 53, Schlegel argues: “Both having and not having a system are fatal to the spirit. Thus, the spirit must resolve to unify the two” (vol. 2, p. 173; No. 53). In Athenaeum Fragment 383, he relates his dictum to the realm of wit: “Systematic wit must be systematic and yet must not be systematic. In spite of its perfection, it must seem as though it lacks something, like it has been torn [abgerissen][23] to pieces. Such baroque things will produce great style of wit” (vol. 2, p. 236; AF 383).

Lessing’s dissertations depart from a topic that is given to him by “contingency,” adding to it a “concept of the highest order” and “refuting” prevailing prejudices. Crossing various genres, Lessing dares to present “examples” when treating a theory and to offer only his “speculative opinions” where “his readers expect concrete examples.” Lessing’s work, ripe with such “paradox,” appears without any particular structure at all. Schlegel, however, finds structure “everywhere,” i.e., “both in the parts and in the whole . . . thoughts are expressed and arranged in an astonishing manner.” The principle that supports such combination of thoughts is “wit”[24]. Wit evokes awe in the reader and activates the reader’s thinking itself. In this sense, “The very process of Lessing’s thought is itself genius [genialisch] and also brings about genius [genieerregend]” (pp. 50-51).

Schlegel calls the “apparently formless form” of Lessing’s fragments an “innate form” (pp. 85, 51). Schlegel posits that “innate form”[25] of fragments expresses a “superiority of wit” with a unique “unity,” a dynamic one that provokes readers to think for themselves. Although such an innate form cannot be sought “in each part,” it can be “evidently found in each series of thoughts and in each mass of thoughts” (p. 51). That is, it is precisely because this form is “innate” that it lodges in all external details.
This determination of “innate form” calls to mind the following passage from A Conversation on Poetry (1800):

... the highest beauty, indeed the highest order is yet only that of chaos, namely of such a one that waits only for the touch of love to unfold as a harmonious world, of such a chaos as the ancient mythology and poetry were. ... All poems of antiquity join one to the other, till from ever increasing masses and members the whole is formed. Everything interpenetrates everything else, and everywhere there is one and the same spirit, only expressed differently. And thus it is truly no empty image to say: Ancient poetry is a single, indivisible, and perfect poem (vol. 2, p. 313).

The “order” referred to in this passage is by no means static – rather, it is the “order of chaos” that brings with it the possibility of development into a harmonious world. As such, “the highest order” exists only within this development[26]. That “one and the same spirit” can be found in various details is also surely attributable to the same dynamic development. Incidentally, this passage, written in 1800, closely resembles the following passage quoted above from On the Study of Greek Poetry (1795) in which Schlegel states that the chaos of modern literature “– just like the Chaos of old out of which, according to legend, the world emerged – awaits a love and hatred in order to separate the different parts and to unify the similar parts” (vol. 1, p. 224). Upon detailed inspection, however, an essential difference emerges. Whereas Schlegel argues in 1795 that “love and hatred” will “separate the different parts” to bring forth a unity, thereby opposing chaos to unity, Schlegel in 1800 rejects this duality. This explains why Schlegel lacked a positive viewpoint vis-à-vis the fragment in 1795.

Schlegel posits that the “order of chaos” contains creative potential and, in Athenaeum Fragment 375, he uses the term, “energy,” writing: “Energy does not possess the slightest desire to show what it can do.” Schlegel is saying that energy does not strive to achieve any “particular objective,” for example, to produce a certain work. However, precisely because of that, energy relates to a certain kind of universality and infinity.

Those who possess energy simply utilize each moment; they are everywhere prepared and infinitely flexible. They possess an infinite number of projects, or no projects at all. In other words, energy is more than vitality – that is, it is active and directed outward, yet it is a universal power, by means of which a whole man constructs and conducts himself (vol. 2, p. 234; AF 375).

People who possess energy are not those who fervently devote themselves to a certain action, but rather those who “operate in calm.” Energy is a constellation of possible projects (that is, possible fragments). Further, a person with energy has a disposition to curtail these myriad possibilities to what is appropriate at each given moment, thus producing a certain action. It is through this energy that individuals are able to construct and conduct themselves as wholes. Thus, paradoxically, individuals are whole only because they are composed of infinite fragments.

As we have seen, Schlegel views the fragment as mediation between individuals and totality, the subjective and the objective, what is present and what is absent, chaos and unity,
In a fragment authored in 1798, Schlegel claims that what is usually considered as
Friedrich Schlegel

The Lessing used the word
In part 5,
The wit is a principle of sociability

See the following texts for an overview regarding the idea of fragment throughout ancient

Ernst Zinn argues that Luther’s

Refer to the following 1798 fragment: “Only the Germans and the French have fragments. Lessing

and Chamfort” (vol. 18, p. 263; No. 830).

Ernst Zinn argues that Luther’s translation of the Bible occasioned the word “fragment” that had

not existed in classical antiquity to be widely used. See Ernst Zinn, Fragmente über Fragmente, in:


W. Fromm, Geheimnis der Entzweyung. Zur Ästhetik des Fragments in der Früromantik, in:


Friedrich Schlegel, On the Study of Greek Poetry. Translated, edited, and with a critical introduction by Stuart Barnett. New York: SUNY, 2001, p. 53. Concerning “romantic poetry,” namely the so-called romances of the chivalry, Schlegel also argues that, in the late Middle Ages, the poetry declined so that there was only “a chaos of wretched fragments of romantic poetry, abortive imitations of misunderstood models” (p. 37).

In On the Study of Greek Poetry, Schlegel uses the word “torn [abgerissen]” three times, always referring to fragments. We will come back to this topic in the part 5. See note 23.

In part 5, we will deal with the concept of “chaos” again.

The “tradition” that Schlegel here refers to is most likely the opening passages of Ovid’s Metamorphoses, which address the cosmogony.

Friedrich Schlegel, op. cit., p. 21. Emphasis is original. Analyzing the different values assigned to “chaos” in On the Study of Greek Poetry (1795) vis-à-vis his works thereafter will allow us to better understand how these works differ. This problem will be addressed later in the paper.

In a fragment authored in 1798, Schlegel claims that what is usually considered as “a whole work” is, in fact, “merely a mixture of other works” (vol. 2, p. 169; AF 23).

For more on Schlegel’s view on Lessing, please refer to: Lagny, Anne and Denis Thouard, Schlegel, lecteur de Lessing: Réflexions sur la construction d’un classique, in: Études Germaniques 52 (1997).

The wit is a principle of sociability, as is seen in the Athenaeum Fragment 56: “The wit is a logical sociability” (vol. 2, p. 154; AF 56). “Wit” is discussed at greater length in Part 5 of the present paper.

Lessing used the word “ferment” in the form “Fermenta cognitionis” at the end of 95th section in
Hamburg Dramaturgy.

[14] Cf. vol. 18, p. 49; No. 308, and vol. 18, p. 92; No. 750.


[17] In Athenaeum Fragment 220, referring to Leibniz, Schlegel uses the phrase “fragments and projects” (vol. 2, p. 200; AF 220).

[18] The duality of the letter and the spirit, which in the wake of Fichte’s The Letter and the Spirit in Philosophy (1795) was a matter of dispute in the late eighteenth century, remounts to the relationship between the old and new testaments (Refer to: Romans (3:29 and 7:6) and Corinthians II (3:6)). For further regarding the antipodes of “spirit and letter” that revert to the Bible from the end of the 18th century, see Ursula Franke, Poetische und philosophische Rede. Die Kontroverse zwischen Schiller und Fichte zur Semiotik, in: Heinz Paetzold (Ed.), Modelle für eine semiotische Rekonstruktion der Geschichte der Ästhetik, Aachen 1987.

[19] As for the relationship between the individual and the infinite, please see the following: “For any individual, and infinite number of real definitions are possible” (vol. 2, p. 177; AF 82). Incidentally, this fragment bears a certain importance, as it one of a few to refer to Chamfort, who bore a direct influence on Schlegel’s view on fragment. Other published reference to Chamfort are: vol. 2, p. 154; L 59, vol. 2, p. 161; L 111. Please refer to: Pikulik, op. cit., p. 124.

[20] Criticism is based on the same principle as transcendental poetry that “must be exponentiated infinitely and analyzed infinitely” (vol. 16, p. 154; No. 804). It follows, therefore, that criticism itself must be “exponentiated infinitely and analyzed infinitely” as well.


[22] Here again we can see Kant’s influence. Refer to the Critique of Pure Reason, B. 865.

[23] In this Athenaeum Fragment, Schlegel points out that what is perfect is at the same time “torn,” which clearly refutes his early dualism in On the Study of Greek Poetry (1795). As for the adjective “torn [abgerissen],” see note 6.


[26] Refer to the following two fragments for further on “chaos”: “Only the confusion from which a world can emerge is chaos” (vol. 2, p. 263; I 71). “Romantic poetry is chaotic, but organized in itself” (vol. 16, p. 318; No. 761).

* Thanks are due to Mr. David Boyd for his assistance in translating my article.