Words and Passions in Edmund Burke: Revisiting Burke’s “Sublime” with Pseudo-Longinus

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Preface

In this paper, by examining the relationship between “word” and “passion” in A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757/59) by Edmund Burke (1729–97), I intend to situate his theory on the sublime in the tradition of rhetoric [1]. More concretely, by focusing on the role of passion in this book, I will reconsider Burke’s theory on the sublime as a critical successor to On the Sublime by Pseudo-Longinus.

First, it seems necessary to justify such an approach to Burkian theory on the sublime. As is well known, in part V of The Sublime and Beautiful, Burke relates the essence of poetry to “sympathy” rather than “imitation” by discussing the influence of words on the passion of others. As I will show in the following sections, part V of this book deviates from its end, which is to clarify the origin of the notions of “sublime” and “beautiful,” so that it could be read as theory on language independently from the entire book. Further, the fact that he focuses on “words” reminds us of the influence of Pseudo-Longinus’ On the Sublime on Burke.

Generally, the influence of Pseudo-Longinus on Burke is barely referenced in discussions of the notion of the sublime in the work of the latter. Rather, from the historical viewpoint, Burke is often recognized as having introduced the rhetorical notion of the sublime to psychology and prepared the way to the “analytic of the sublime” that Kant delineated in The Critique of Judgment (1790). Thus, the discontinuation, not continuation, from Pseudo-Longinus to Burke has long been emphasized. Indeed, Burke refers to Pseudo-Longinus only once, and the reference to him in the preface of first edition published in 1757 was replaced in the second edition in 1759. Furthermore, the following fact offers more evidence of the discontinuation between them: the sublime in the Latin rhetorical tradition had been succeeded by some French writers like Nicolas Boileau, who translated On the Sublime into French in 1674; on the other hand, in the first part of the 18th Century, when Burke prepared the book, the alternative view of the sublime that differed from the continental one had already begun to form and Burke had an influence on the creation of such an atmosphere. These facts are meant to explain why Burke referred to Pseudo-Longinus only once in his treatise on the sublime.

Although these facts have been acknowledged, the continuity between them can be recognized by focusing on the relationship between words and passions in Burke. As I will show, there is much evidence of this in the last part of his book, where he admires poetry over painting. Concretely speaking, proofs, such as the description on the “sympathy” or “contagion of the passion,” and the statement requiring division between “clear expression” and “strong
expression” will explain the continuity that exists between Pseudo-Longinus and Burke. In the following sections, through careful reading, I will show how *The Sublime and Beautiful* acts as a critical successor to Pseudo-Longinus’ *On the Sublime*.

1. The Problem of Language in *The Sublime and Beautiful* by Burke

First, I review the construction of *The Sublime and Beautiful* by Burke. It comprises five parts and aims to distinguish the notions of the sublime and beautiful, which have been “frequently confounded” according to the preface to first edition. Judging from the construction of the book, Burke’s discourse is not sufficiently systematized, although it is safe to say that it maintains a certain consistency along its main subject. The construction of this book should be summarized in the following manner.

In part I, Burke classifies passions according to the poles of pleasure and pain, and promptly compares the sublime and the beautiful [2]. In parts II and III, he enumerates many sources of the sublime and beautiful and then addresses the more detailed mechanism that causes these feelings in part IV. These four parts are based on psychological and physiological observations, which were aligned with the contemporary empiricism in England at the time; thus, the basic manner of discussion is clear and consistent. However, in part V, the approach is entirely different. The main subject of this part is the art of language, that is, poetry and rhetoric. Burke explains why he addresses these subjects at the beginning of this part:

Natural objects affect us, by the laws of that connexion, which Providence has established between certain motions and configurations of bodies, and certain consequent feelings in our minds. Painting affects in the same manner, but with the superadded pleasure of imitation. Architecture affects by the laws of nature, and the law of reason; from which latter result the rules of proportion, which make a work to be praised or censured, in the whole or in some part, when the end for which it was designed is or is not properly answered. But as to words; they seem to me to affect us in a manner very different from that in which we are affected by natural objects, or by painting or architecture; yet words have as considerable a share in exciting ideas of beauty and of the sublime as any of those, and sometimes a much greater than any of them; therefore an enquiry into the manner by which they excite such emotions is far from being unnecessary in a discourse of this kind. (V, 1, 163)

It is true that his statement on the necessity of the observation of words is persuasive. Moreover, it is consistent with the preceding parts, considering he discusses the effect the power of language has on us. Nevertheless, it is apparent that there is also discontinuity between the preceding four parts (I–IV) and the last part (V). Between parts I and IV, Burke has shown many examples of poetry, painting, architecture, and natural objects that influence our passions. However, in part V, he never addresses anything but poetry—and painting, which is opposed to it—and concentrates on how the influence of words on our passions could be demonstrated. In this sense, the last part of *The Sublime and Beautiful* concludes the
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Discussion on poetry and prose that was partially discussed in the preceding parts, instead of engaging in the discussion of the entire book, which seeks to investigate the “origins of the sublime and beautiful” in our minds.

Indeed, part V tends to be seen as independent from the other parts of the book [3]. On one hand, some people relate its rhetorical discussion to Burke’s political activity after publishing the book. On the other hand, it has been read as a refutation of French writer Jean-Baptiste Dubos (1670-1742), who estimated that painting held a higher position than poetry. The former reading recognizes *The Sublime and Beautiful* as a manifestation of the sensibilities of the young Burke, who would become a famous politician in the latter part of his life. Moreover, the latter reading emphasizes the discussion of “paragone (comparison between poetry and painting)” and concludes that Burke insisted on the preeminence of poetry, while Dubos insisted on that of painting [4]. In any case, the empirical and psychological observations by Burke turn out to be a sort of poetics or rhetoric in the last part of the book. Furthermore, the very subject of the division between the sublime and beautiful seems to be neglected as a secondary aspect [5].

2. “Passion” and “Word” in Burke’s Discussion on Language

Burke classifies words into three categories in section 2 of part V: (1) “aggregate words,” such as man, horse, tree, castle; (2) “simple abstract words,” such as red, blue, round, square; (3) and “compounded abstract words,” such as virtue, honor, persuasion. According to Burke, the first corresponds to “many simple ideas united by nature,” the second to “one simple idea,” and the third to “an arbitrary union of both the others, and of the various relations between them” (V, 2, 163-4). However, in section 4 of this part, Burke states they are the only expedient categories for the more essential subject [6].

What, then, is the essential subject here? The aim of this section is, ultimately, to assert that the main effect of language is not imitation. By referring to the three categories he has mentioned, Burke summarizes the effects of language in the following manner: language has the three effects of “sound,” “picture,” and “affection of the soul.” Among these, the “picture,” which will be the most important in the following discussion, is defined as a “representation of the thing signified by the sound” (V, 4, 166), while “affection of the soul” is “produced by one or by both of the foregoing [=sound and picture].” According to Burke, compounded abstract words can create sound and cause affection of the soul, but cannot a picture. Compounded abstract words such as “honor, justice, liberty” have no corresponding objects as aggregate words and simple abstract words do. He continues to say that simple abstract words can produce all the three effects, and aggregate words can do so at an even higher degree.

However, it is important to note the following fact: Burke does not intend to say that compounded abstract words are inferior to aggregate words and simple abstract words. In fact, the opposite is true. As he states in the following paragraph, the general effect of language is not to produce a picture through the imagination, but to urge the hearers and readers to sympathize. In other words, it is true that we form some pictures from simple abstract words or aggregate ones, but these are merely derived from “a particular effort of the imagination” (V, 4,
If so, in contrast to our expectations, compounded abstract words would hold the most
general power of language. Since they cannot produce “pictures” that correspond to them, it
could be said that they can produce the “affection of the soul” only by the “sound” of words
without “pictures.”

In section 5 of this part, Burke attempts to provide “examples that words may affect
without raising images,” as the title of section indicates. He enumerates examples of Mr.
Blacklock, a poet blind from his birth, Mr. Saunderson, a blind professor of mathematics, and
some noteworthy poems. The most important observation appears when Burke examines *De
Rerum Natura* by Lucretius [7]:

> What idea do you derive from so excellent a picture? none at all most certainly; neither has
the poet said a single word which might in the least serve to mark a single limb or feature
of the phantom, which he intended to represent in all the horrors imagination can
conceive. In reality poetry and rhetoric do not succeed in exact description so well as
painting does; their business is to affect rather by sympathy than imitation; to display
rather the effect of things on the mind of the speaker, or of others, than to present a clear
idea of the things themselves. (V, 5, 172)

Burke repeats these points in the following sections. Confirming that poetry is not by
nature a mimetic art, he indicates three reasons for the stronger affectiveness of poetry than
painting. First, we can “take an extraordinary part in the passions of others” through words and
express strong emotion, for it often happens that we experience stronger emotion as a result of
others’ opinions on a thing, than from the thing itself (V, 7, 173). Second, words can also
express what is rarely realized, or what does not exist, in such a manner that it induces very
strong emotions in us (V, 7, 173-4). Third, words have the added power of “combinations,”
which paintings do not have. These “combinations” are, by nature, different from the “laws of
combination” that Burke referred to in the preceding section. As examples of “combinations,”
Burke presents the “angel of the Lord” or “universe of Death,” insisting that these are not
adequately represented in paintings. The “combinations” that are provided in the above
examples are entirely different from the “laws of combination” or dispositions of things in
painting. According to Burke, we cannot obtain any clear ideas from such combinations of
words, and it is for this very reason that these expressions affect us so strongly (V, 7, 174).

As I mentioned above, Burke explains the influence of words on our passions from three
perspectives. First, poetry has to be distinguished from other arts like painting or architecture,
in that words make it possible for us to “take part in” others’ passions. Second, words, or poetry,
greatly influence our passions by representing the things that are not visually grasped in reality.
Third, words induce strong emotions in us through the power of “combinations” that is
appropriate to them.

The preeminence of words is founded on the fact that they are capable of demonstrating
our opinions on certain things as well as demonstrating the thing itself. Burke goes on to say
that they induce strong emotions in us through their capability of transmitting opinions or
inviting sympathy. In other words, the linguistic expression he supposes here is a non-
representative expression, the nature of which is not conveying a “clear expression” of things and events but rather a “strong expression,” not relying on “imitation” but on “sympathy.”

This is difficult to us, because we do not sufficiently distinguish, in our observations upon language, between a clear expression and a strong expression. These are frequently confounded with each other, though they are in reality extremely different. The former regards the understanding; the latter belongs to the passions. The one describes a thing as it is; the other describes it as it is felt. [...] The truth is, all verbal description, merely as naked description, though never so exact, conveys so poor and insufficient an idea of the thing described, that it could scarcely have the smallest effect, if the speaker did not call in to his aid those modes of speech that mark a strong and lively feeling in himself. Then, by the contagion of our passions, we catch a fire already kindled in another, which probably might never have been struck out by the object described. (V, 7, 175-6)

Therefore, it would be safe to say that the expression “the contagion of our passions” practically refers to the “sympathy” mentioned above. From these lines, it is evident that Burke understands the word “sympathy” in the strong sense, that is, it means “to share (syn-) others’ passions (pathos) [8].” For Burke, the most fundamental power of words is to act on a hearer’s or reader’s passions, thereby resulting in “sympathy” or “contagion of passions.”

3. The Notion of “Pathos” in Pseudo-Longinus’ On the Sublime

As stated in the preface of this paper, it is in the discussion of words and passions that continuity between Pseudo-Longinus and Burke can be found. Before examining this, I present the lines in which Burke refers to Pseudo-Longinus in The Sublime and Beautiful. The following lines are cited from the last paragraph of section 17 of part I, the subject of which is “ambition”:

Hence proceeds what Longinus has observed of that glorying and sense of inward greatness, that always fills the reader of such passages in poets and orators as are sublime; it is what every man must have felt in himself upon such occasions. (I, 17, 51) [9]

Furthermore, in the preface to the first edition published in 1757, Burke criticizes Pseudo-Longinus, although this criticism was replaced in the preface to the second edition in 1759.

He [=Burke] observed that the ideas of the sublime and beautiful were frequently confounded; and that both were indiscriminately applied to things greatly differing, and sometimes of natures directly opposite. Even Longinus, in his incomparable discourse upon a part of this subject, has comprehended things extremely repugnant to each other, under one common name of the Sublime. (Preface to the first edition, 1)

The reason Pseudo-Longinus is relatively neglected could be explained by the following
account. According to J. T. Boulton, an editor of The Sublime and Beautiful, Burke read On the Sublime when he was a student at Trinity College. It was given to him as a masterpiece of rhetoric and influenced him greatly. It is true that On the Sublime is one of the important sources of The Sublime and Beautiful. If so, why did he mention it but once—though twice in the first edition—in his own treatise? According to Boulton, this could be explained from a historical and contextual viewpoint. On the Sublime was first translated into English in the middle of the 17th Century, at which point it greatly influenced people across Europe through the publication of the French translation by Boileau and another English translation by Smith, which appeared in the second part of the 17th Century. However, in the 1740s when Burke prepared The Sublime and Beautiful, the influence of Pseudo-Longinus had already gradually diminished, whereas the new type of “sublime” based on empirical and psychological observations came to be accepted in mainstream England [10]. This situation is also reflected in the fact that Burke frequently refers to Locke, Hutchson, Hume, and Dubos in his treatise.

Nevertheless, one can perceive the influence of Pseudo-Longinus on Burke in part V, the subject of which is poetry and rhetoric. More precisely, this influence is that of the rhetorical tradition that originated in the writings of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian and also Pseudo-Longinus. In any case, at least, by focusing on “passion” in the Burkean treatise, the contact point of Pseudo-Longinus and Burke should be found, as “passion (pathos)” is one of the most important notions in Pseudo-Longinus [11].

Reading along a perspective such as this, the description of pathos can be found in chapter 8, where the five sources of sublimity are enumerated. Following the first source, “the power of forming great conceptions,” “vehement and inspired passion” is listed as the second source of the sublime. These being “for the most part innate,” there remain three other sources “partly the product of art,” that include “the due formation of figures,” “noble diction,” and “dignified and elevated composition.” Read literally, these lines reveal “vehement and inspired passion” is not more than one source of the sublime (On the Sublime, VIII, 1).

However, it is too soon to conclude that “passion” is nothing but an element of the sublime here. After the lines mentioned above, Pseudo-Longinus says, “there is no tone so lofty as that of genuine passion in its right place” (On the Sublime, VIII, 4), criticizing Cecilius—another writer of a treatise on the sublime—for his lack of consideration on passion. I can enumerate such cases in this book. For example, Pseudo-Longinus evaluates Demosthenes’ exceptional passion in the following manner: “Demosthenes draws—as from a store—excellences allied to the highest sublimity and perfected to the utmost, the tone of lofty speech, living passions, copiousness, readiness, speed, and that power and vehemence of his which forbid approach” (On the Sublime, XXXIV, 4).

How were these insistences on passion understood by Burke’s contemporaries? John Dennis (1657–1734), who is the most famous and enthusiastic follower of Pseudo-Longinus, is one of the writers who emphasized the importance of passion in his treatise. M. H. Abrams states, “What Dennis has done is to elaborate upon Peri Hupsous [=On the Sublime] by making the emotions, which to Longinus had been only one of several sources of the single quality of sublimity, into indispensable—almost the sufficient—source and mark of all poetry [12].” As Abrams states, On the Sublime had been frequently referred to in English Romanticism as a
great pioneer that emphasized the importance of “passion” and “emotion.”

It should also be noted that the recognitions of Dennis and Abrams are not as correct. To be precise, “passion” in Pseudo-Longinus is not just one source of sublimity. As is evident from the preceding paragraphs, while it is considered the second and innate source of the sublime in chapter VIII, the vehement passions of great poets and rhetoricians are frequently identified with the “sublime (hypsos)” itself throughout the book. While Pseudo-Longinus mainly presents examples of orators, he occasionally discusses the contagion of the passion among audiences as well.

[...]

In dealing with figures in chapter XVII, Pseudo-Longinus states that orator’s passions often “detoxicate” the hearer’s suspicion. He emphasizes this aspect again by mentioning cases in which the hearer “shares the excitement of the speaker.” As this expression literally means, “sharing the enthusiasm (synenthousian),” the subject discussed here is the contagion of passion from speaker to hearers. Generally, if too many figures were used, the speaker would be in danger of being suspected of unfaithfulness. However, such suspicion could be detoxified by “timely passion and noble sublimity,” which conceal the artifacts and have a strong effect on hearers.

These lines are important to comparing Burke, who speaks of the “contagion of our passion,” with Pseudo-Longinus. Moreover, it is worth considering chapter XV of On the Sublime in which Pseudo-Longinus emphasizes “strong expression,” which is opposed to the mere representation of fact, in reading Hyperides. As was evident in section 2 of this paper, according to Burke, “clear expression” is tied to “imitation” and “strong expression” to “sympathy.” Further, he clearly emphasizes the latter in part V of The Sublime and Beautiful. Like Burke, Pseudo-Longinus also speaks of the importance of strong expression; however, his emphasis is poised on the different roles of poetry and prose.

Further, you will be aware of the fact that an image has one purpose with the orators and another with the poets, and that the object of the poetical image is enthralment, and that of the rhetorical is vivid description [13]. Both, however, seek to stir the passions and the emotions. (On the Sublime, XV, 2)

The purpose of the poetical image is enthralment, while that of the rhetorical is vivid description, although both seek to “stir the passions and the emotions.” In other words, for Pseudo-Longinus, a hearer’s acting on passion is the most essential problem with the use of language. However, for Burke, the difference between “clear expression” and “strong
expression” does not correspond to the difference between genres. As we have seen, the difference between them is related to whether a “picture” is produced. According to Burke, while “clear expression” can only cause “imitation,” “strong expression” can produce “sympathy,” which is the essential effect of words. These are among the most important aspects in *The Sublime and Beautiful*.

This comparison has revealed that the relationship between words and passions in Burke’s writings is not dependent on the form of expression. While Pseudo-Longinus—who ascribed different roles to poetry and rhetoric—states that both have a common purpose of producing passions and emotions, Burke regards the purpose of the arts of language as arousing “sympathy,” not achieving “imitation.” These are the essential differences between Pseudo-Longinus and Burke. Apart from these, there is another important difference. In clarifying this difference, I will conclude the paper.

4. Conclusion: Whether There Is a “Picture”

As I have stated earlier, for Burke, to make a “picture” that is a “representation of the thing signified by the sound” is not an essential effect of language. According to him, engendering the representation of the real thing, the “imitation” to use his words, is the purpose of paintings, while words can act directly on the passion of a hearer and reader without affecting the formation of such clear pictures. Interestingly, such a viewpoint is entirely opposite to that of Pseudo-Longinus—in his treatise, the pictures created by orators are inseparable from the passion caused. The following passage is cited from chapter XV, where Pseudo-Longinus addresses the transmission of words through the strong passion of the orator.

Images [*phantasia*], moreover, contribute greatly, my young friend, to dignity, elevation and power as a pleader. In this sense some call them “mental representations.” In a general way the name of *image* or *imagination* [*eidolopoiia*] is applied to every idea of the mind, in whatever form it presents itself, which gives birth to speech. But at the present day the word is predominantly used in cases where, carried away by enthusiasm and passion, you think you see what you describe, and you place it before the eyes of your hearers. (*On the Sublime*, XV, 1) [14]

According to these lines, a certain image is transmitted through the passion of orators to an audience. In contrast to such a view, in Burke’s writing, the act of passion seems to be independent from the occurrence of such an image. For Burke, the words that can produce the “picture” are “simple abstract words” and “aggregate words,” whereas “compounded abstract words,” including “God, Universe, Death” and other ideal nouns, are regarded as the most affective because they do not have a visual corresponding to them. “Compounded abstract words” result in “affection of the soul” only through their “sound,” so that “pictures” formed by imagination or habit have no place to act.

For this very reason, Burke’s standpoint is entirely opposite to that of Pseudo-Longinus. As far as the preface to the first edition is concerned, Burke’s criticism is not as essential. The
greatest opposition between them is the role of “picture” in the discussion of words and passions. As is often indicated, it is not so clear whether Burke makes much account of the visual in his theory on the sublime or not. However, in part V of The Sublime and Beautiful, the anti-visual standpoint of Burke is evident. Burkan theory on words and passions is characterized by praise of “sound” that engenders “sympathy” and rejection of the “picture.”

In this paper, I have shown that Burke succeeded the framework of Pseudo-Longinus to a certain extent, in that he emphasizes “passion.” However, The Sublime and Beautiful adopts an opposite view to On the Sublime in that the former states that the relationship between words and passions is formed without a “picture.” As I stated in the preface to this paper, such influence and difference remain invisible in superficial comparisons between the two works. Moreover, the presupposition that Burke has changed the meaning of the sublime that originated with Pseudo-Longinus appears to make the influence and difference even less visible. Against such opinions, I sought to show that there is a certain residue of rhetorical tradition in Burke’s treatise. This relation to the past should be an indispensable perspective to have when reading The Sublime and Beautiful.

Notes


[2] This opposition of “pleasure” and “pain” corresponds to that of “society” and “self-preservation.” See part I, section 6 ff. In addition, Burke presents other oppositional coupling like “sublime” and “beautiful,” “light” and “darkness,” “men” and “women,” etc. These oppositions have often incurred criticisms that indicate contradictions or inconsistencies. The remarkable example is the description of “a negro woman” in The Sublime and Beautiful, which is analyzed by Meg Armstrong, “The Effects of Blackness: Gender, Race, and the Sublime in Aesthetic Theories of Burke and Kant,” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 54, no. 3, 1996, pp. 214-221. Terry Eagleton discusses such oppositions in Burke from a wider perspective in The Ideology of the Aesthetics, Oxford; Cambridge: Basil Blackwell, 1990, pp. 52-66.


[5] More precisely, by shifting the opposition of the “sublime and beautiful” to that of “poetry and painting,” Burke partially changes the subject of this book.

[6] It is often noted that John Locke had an influence on these three categories. See Dixon Wecter, “Burke’s Theory of Words, Images, and Emotion,” PMLA, vol. 55, no. 1, 1940, pp. 169-171; Burleigh Taylor Wilkins, “Burke on Words,” Studies in Burke and his Time: A Journal devoted to British, America, and Continental Culture 1750-1800, vol. 11, 1969, pp. 1305-1309. In addition, the concept of “idea” that Burke frequently uses in this book seems to have been influenced by Locke. The notion Burke uses in part V is practically synonymous with “representation,” as was Locke’s. Translators of the French and German version of The Sublime and Beautiful basically translate “idea” as “représentation, Vorstellung (representation)” or “image, Bild (image).” See Recherches philosophiques sur l’origine de nos idées du sublime et du beau, traduit by Baldine Saint Girons.
“Humana ante oculos fœdè cum vita jaceret, / In terris, oppressa gravi sub religione, / Quœ caput e cœli regionibus ostendebat / Horribili desuper visu mortalibus instans; / Primus Graius homo mortales tollere contra / Est oculos ausus.” (De Rerum Natura, I, 62-67). Burke slightly modified the original text by Lucretius.

It must be noted that the “sympathy” used here is entirely different from how the word is used in part I, section 16 of The Sublime and Beautiful.

In the 18th Century, it was believed that On the Sublime (Peri Hupsous) was written by Cassius Longinus, while it is now estimated to be someone’s work in the 1st Century. On the reception of this text after the 16th Century, see Baldine Saint Girons, “Sublime” in Barbara Cassin (ed.), Vocabulaire européen des philosophies: dictionnaire des intraduisibles, Paris: Seuil; Le Robert, 2004, pp. 1226-1252.

See Edmund Burke, A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful, James T. Boulton (ed.), Editor’s Introduction, xvi and xlvii. Some people estimate that the influence of Pseudo-Longinus on Burke has been greater than Boulton did. See Dixon Wecter, “Burke’s Theory of Words, Images, and Emotion,” op. cit., pp. 172-173. Although Wecter’s paper focuses on words, images, and emotion in The Sublime and Beautiful, his comparison of Pseudo-Longinus and Burke is too brief to be referred to.


“Vivid description” is translated from “enargeia” in Greek, which generally means “what gives clear, vivid impression.” However, the definition of enargeia varies among exemplary rhetoricians like Cicero or Quintilian. See Carlo Ginzburg, “Descrizione e citazione,” in Il filo e le tracce. Vero falso finto, Milano: Feltrinelli, 2006.

Roberts translates “phantasia” as “image.” This notion of phantasia is generally translated into “image,” “imagination,” or “visualization.” However, it is very difficult to fix its translated word, for it is important notion originated from Plato, Aristotle, and Stoicism. With regard to this problem, see the commentary by J. Pigeaud. Longin, Du Sublime, traduit par Jackie Pigeaud (1991), op. cit.

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