Heinrich Schenker’s “Intramusical” Hermeneutics: A Comparison of the Hermeneutics of Hermann Kretzschmar and Wilhelm Dilthey

NISHIDA Hiroko
Kyushu University, Fukuoka

Introduction: Schenker’s Musical Hermeneutics and Musical Analysis

This study compares the concept of hermeneutics proposed by Heinrich Schenker (1868–1935) with that proposed by Hermann Kretzschmar (1848–1924) on the basis of Schenker's criticism of Kretzschmar. Furthermore, it aims to re-examine Schenker's discourse on musical works within the framework of hermeneutics through the concept of hermeneutics formulated by Wilhelm Dilthey (1833–1911).

Kretzschmar, a German musicologist, was famous for “Führer durch den Concertsaal [Guide through the concert hall]” (1887–1890), a series of musical analyses for audience, which led to modern concert program notes. He was also regarded as the founder of musical hermeneutics, the principle of which he formulated in “Proposals to Encourage Musical Hermeneutics (AH)” in 1902 and “New Proposals to Encourage Musical Hermeneutics (NA)” in 1905. Schenker was born in Galicia, on the periphery of the Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, and was an active Jewish music theorist in Vienna. He earned a living mainly by giving private lessons in piano and music theory, and also by writing and publishing articles on music. After the Second World War, his Jewish pupils emigrated to America. Subsequently, the so-called “Schenkerian analysis” came to be put into practice there [1].

First, we should identify the conflict that is the focus of this paper. An American musicologist K. Agawu outlines the “hermeneutic approach” and “theory-based analysis” and discusses the characteristics of these contrasting positions. Hermeneutics is the approach taken by American musicologists since the 1980s who once again began to address the problems in the field of musical hermeneutics, which Kretzschmar founded in early 20th-century Germany. In contrast, “theory-based analysis” means Schenkerian analysis, which was established in Vienna in the first half of the 20th century and was reorganized and developed in postwar America[2]. The modern hermeneutic approach shares ideas with Kretzschmar’s criticism of formalism, because the former criticizes Schenkerian analysis as a “formalistic” analysis.

Not only in America but also in music criticism since the early 19th century Europe, such an opposition between hermeneutics and analysis has been employed, although partly sublated [3]. However, what is desired here is not to keep this superficial understanding of the conflict between hermeneutics and analysis and to reinforce it, but rather to reconsider such a historical phenomenon from a new perspective. In addition, although Kretzschmar and Schenker have been referred to as representatives of these two poles, the relationship between
them in their lifetime has been seldom investigated. For, although both men published an analytic series of musical works, it might be difficult to compare them on the same level because Kretzschmar’s series tended to be gauged as more popular, while Schenker’s were regarded as more professional. However, the fact that Schenker severely attacked Kretzschmar in his writings can be a good starting point to scrutinize the substance of this dichotomy. Therefore, this paper cuts off one section of the conflict history that Agawu describes: we go back to these two German-speaking musical theorists who lived in the early 20th century.

Now, we turn our attention to Schenker, a key person in the history of this conflict. In America, since the 1980s, where positivistic Schenkerian analyses have been condemned, a study by R. Snarrenberg has brought forward a new perspective[4]. Snarrenberg used the term “interpretive practice” instead of “analysis” to characterize Schenker’s discourse[5]. One can understand this “interpretation” as a concept, so as not to restrict Schenker’s discourse to analysis in a more limited sense, namely to the framework of “purely technical analysis.” In such a way, Snarrenberg, instead of reinforcing the opposing perspectives, sheds light on the fact that Schenker interprets musical works even using imagery and programmatic ideas. Conversely, as a concept of analysis in a more extensive sense that is not restricted to semantic interpretation, S. Mauser suggests the term “hermeneutics”[6]. Certainly, if one grasps “analysis” as an act that engages solely the structure and does not go further into the area of semantics, and “hermeneutics” as an act that construes feelings and imaginary events from musical works, we have to say that such an understanding is superficial because of its limited idea that semantic interpretations are extramusical. Such a shallow definition arises because the conflict between “hermeneutics” and “analysis” is linked to another distinction peculiar to music: “extramusical” and “intramusical.” However, what is intramusical and what is extramusical cannot be determined clearly, and it depends on each interpreter. In the next section, following Snarrenberg’s as well as Mauser’s arguments, we shall compare Kretzschmar’s and Schenker’s discourses about musical works in light of the concept of hermeneutics in the broader sense in order to decipher on which hermeneutic attitude Schenker’s discourse was grounded.

1. Schenker’s Intramusical Hermeneutics

This section reveals through Schenker’s criticism of Kretzschmar that Schenker himself called his own interpretation a “hermeneutics” and clarifies how Schenker defined hermeneutics. The key here is what the object is in his interpretation of works. Schenker denounced Kretzschmar’s principle of hermeneutics repeatedly, and one can read the most condensed statement of his position in the following passage:

But there is only one indispensable premise to elucidate the life of tone, that is, the very premise of believing what Mr. Kretzschmar and his comrades deny: the musical content! . . . The formal aesthetics can never explain or refute what rests on its own laws, like the life of tone! . . . Rather, the refutation [of Kretzschmar’s hermeneutics] will be carried out by a better and true hermeneutics which tries to make clear the purely musical
content above all! (ES, 57)

The musical content that Kretzschmar rejected was, conversely, what the “true hermeneutics” that Schenker proposes had to tackle. Then, what was intended with the expression of the “purely musical content”? And which kind of hermeneutics was the “true hermeneutics”?

Schenker frequently referred to the “musical content.” As illustrated in the above citation, this term almost always appears in a context in which Schenker condemned interpretations of works by other theorists. From the fact that Schenker put “the last necessities of the content” and “the necessities of the life of tone” in parallel, it turns out that the content is deemed as the “life of tone (Tonleben)” (BS, VIII, IX). Moreover, one can read in the preceding citation that the content, in other words the life of tone, hinges on “its own laws.” Consequently, Kretzschmar’s interpretation, which does not comprehend musical works from the perspective of tonal context but rather connects the life of tone with extramusical elements such as events that happened to the composer or were written about in letters and so forth, was criticized by Schenker because they incorporate extramusical factors into interpretation: “But, a fault is to believe that one adversely has to understand the tones especially by the life. No! The tones are in the first place to be understood only by the tones themselves” (ES, 24). Schenker relies on the premise of the independence of the tonal world where the tones relate only to each other, and separates the tones from the extramusical “life.” To put it plainly, Schenker distinguishes the intramusical from the extramusical and regards the composer’s life as extramusical. Yet, as long as the content is called the “life of tone,” tones should not be irrelevant to the life, which also means the “human life.” Thus, a question arises: how are the tones and the life related in Schenker’s true hermeneutics?

The “life of tone” can be understood as the unification of the world of tone and the world of life on the basis of their inseparability. Schenker’s belief that to understand tones from the “human life” is a fault that appears in the contexts in which he attacked others’ interpretations. In such a critical context, the tonal world and the human life are separate from each other. However, in Schenker’s own hermeneutics, such a segregation of the tones and the life must be impossible. As an example, the following descriptions suggest that the tones and the life for Schenker do not postulate the separation of the intramusical world from the extramusical one, but instead the life is brought into music: “Beethoven could actually experience (erleben) his life, not only outside the tones but also inside the tones (innerhalb der Töne), and if it [his life] occurred inside the tones, two worlds, the world of life and the world of tone, flew for him without losing their characters for each other” (ES, 50) and “in the linear progressions the composer lives his own life as that of the linear progressions” (FS, 18). Put another way, the life of the composer is extramusical in the context in which Schenker found fault with others, but in Schenker’s true hermeneutics, the human life can also belong inside the tones, as when he maintains that “the composer lives also inside the tones.” Music for him is the “image of movement of our life (Abbild unserer Lebensbewegung)” (FS, 19) in the sense that the movement of tones and that of life are corresponding. Furthermore, when Schenker insists that “our own drive of life is one which we also bring into the movement of the Urlinie progression in such a way that the movement reveals a full consonance to our psychic life (ein völliger
"Gleichklang mit unserem Seelenleben" (FS, 16), the movement of the tones united with the life is paraphrased as “a full consonance with our psychic life.” The drive of life is considered something human.

Well then, how is the life internalized inside the tones or how are the tones in which the life is internalized verbalized in Schenker’s interpretation? For example, in the interpretation of Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony, Schenker spoke of the unification of music and life through associations:

Only the above described falling of the rhythm gives our ears the image of that psychic drive (das Abbild jenes psychischen Dranges) which has operated in the soul of the composer himself, when he put the strong accent just on a weak beat (BS, 18).

The falling of the rhythm is the image of the psychic drive that has operated in the soul of the composer, and it can also be perceived by our ears. That is, when the psychic drive is brought into the field of rhythm as a movement of falling, the tones, the composer, and the listeners are combined with each other in this life of tone. More direct verbal expression in Schenker’s discourse to unify the tones and the human life through movement includes the personification of tones, which is an attempt to express the movement of tones as a psychic one. For instance, “tonicization (Tonikalisierung)” treats a brief modulation as a “drive (Trieb)” of tone to become a tonic. The movement of the tone and the movement of life are both embedded into this term by the expression “–ation (–ierung).”

In summary, the difference between the terminology in Schenker’s true hermeneutics and in the context in which he criticized others’ interpretations can originate in the difference between the context of the life and its connotation: when he censured the interpretation that understands the tones as based on the human life, this life means the human life in the actual world in which Beethoven lived, while the life in Schenker’s true hermeneutics is the “life” that is the drive of the soul brought inside the tones, and this drive of the soul inside them, that is, the life of tone appears within musical works as an “inner nexus (innere Zusammenhänge)” (FS, 16). In this way, Schenker tried to develop his own true hermeneutics as grounded in the intramusical life.

2. Kretzschmar’s Human-Internal Hermeneutics

In contrast, Kretzschmar prescribed the concept of musical hermeneutics in 1902 in the following way:

The task of musical hermeneutics is as follows: to draw the affects from the tones and put the skeleton of their development into words. . . . The forms are a means of the expression. What should be expressed is something spiritual (etwas Geistiges). In the sense of the merely musical content, there is no absolute music (AH, 173-175).

For Kretzschmar, what is expressed in the tones are “affects,” namely “a generally spiritual
content (ein allgemein geistiger Inhalt)” (AH, 173). The tones and forms themselves are conversely nothing but a “way station” or a “means.” What he proposed was basically a “theory of feelings and perceptions” to “transpose what was listened to into the psychic and spiritual (Übertragen des Gehörten ins Seelische und Geistige)” (AH, 179-180).

In order to understand the meaning of Kretzschmar’s definition of musical hermeneutics, one has to investigate the circumstances of musical interpretation in that period. Just as Schenker disparaged Kretzschmar, Kretzschmar, who attempted to differentiate his own standpoint from that of others, also criticized the two modes of interpretation of works: first, “a poetic head which goes toward works with enthusiasm, instead of proceeding soberly and objectively,” and second, the interpretive mode that satisfies only with the “description of the outer form of works,” “brings the technical details regardless, instead of explaining the development of the affects,” and consequently, cannot make readers understand the works spiritually (AH, 178-179). Examples of both — the “poetic” and the “mechanical” (NA, 290) — interpretations are those by Carmen Sylva and Carl van Bruyck.

In Sylva’s interpretation of J. S. Bach’s Fugue in C major, she employs the character “Sacuntala” from a drama from ancient India. However, such an excessive fantasy and poetic program was not acceptable for Kretzschmar because it seemed to have little relation to the tones in themselves. According to him, it is possible to introduce poetic images, but they play only a secondary role. On the contrary, the “affects” he advocated are an indispensable concept for pursuing the “whole” process of a work[7]. On the other hand, van Bruyck in his mechanical and formalistic interpretation gave this fugue a negative judgment because, seen from the aesthetic viewpoint, it was monotonous and rigid. Kretzschmar reacted to this judgment by saying “van Bruyck is not sufficiently trained in the aesthetics of music to be able to listen out (heraushören) the inner sense (innerer Sinn) from Bach’s notes” (NA, 291).

In this respect, Sylva’s as well as van Bruyck’s interpretations cannot dominate the view of the development of the theme “as a whole” correctly. As if Kretzschmar were correcting these inadequacies, he himself in 1905 interpreted this fugue along with the affects and demonstrated his own musical hermeneutics by pursuing the whole process of the piece. As he said that “neither the poetic divination nor the formal analysis is enough” (NA, 287), his musical hermeneutics tries to advance both from an interpretation based solely on images and from the purely formal description. From this, one can observe that both Kretzschmar and Schenker claimed originality and validity for their own hermeneutics.

Next, we shall turn our attention to Kretzschmar’s above-cited view: “van Bruyck is not sufficiently trained in the aesthetics of music to be able to listen out the inner sense from Bach’s notes.” What does the adjective “inner” of “the inner sense” indicate specifically, and how does it relate to the category of Schenker’s “intramusical”?

3. Inner and Outer: Hermeneutics and Analysis Re-examined

Kretzschmar’s criticism of mechanical analysis corresponds with arguments that have appeared recently in America, in that both oppose “formalism.” However, if we re-examine the conflict between the two types of interpretation in this section by paying attention to the
category “inner,” we cannot juxtapose Kretzschmar’s musical hermeneutics with the hermeneutic approach in America on the same lines. For, while the latter criticizes the “intramusical” and formalistic Schenkerian analysis and turns its eyes to the “extramusical” elements willingly[8], the former views its own musical hermeneutics as “inner,” arguing that the mechanical interpretation is “outer” formalism. In short, the meaning of “inner” and “outer” imposed by hermeneutics and analysis varies in each context. One can infer that this disparity corresponds to the discrepancy between Kretzschmar’s and Schenker’s terminologies. This may be because Kretzschmar’s distinction between inner and outer is different from that of Schenker. In addition, Schenker’s terminology would be congruent with one in the conflict pair in postwar America.

The musical aesthetics that attempts to “listen out the inner sense from the tones” points to the musical hermeneutics that Kretzschmar himself advocated. Consequently, one can see that the content with which his musical hermeneutics deals is inner for him. In addition, he considers the musical form as outer, as seen in his criticism of van Bruyck for describing only the outer form. Kretzschmar shares this distinction with Schenker, in that both refuted the prevailing formalistic analysis. For Schenker also clearly distinguished his own formal theory from the existing formalism and refuted the latter. However, Kretzschmar in the first place regarded the tones and the form in itself as outer, and the term “inner” can be seen, for example, in such a remark: “one goes to an inner understanding (Verständnis) of musical works through gradual unregularized listening into (Hineinhören)” (NA, 281). He defined a task of musical hermeneutics as “the ability to listen to tones internally (innerlich hören) and determine the content” (AH, 190). Hence, Kretzschmar’s “inner” means the human internal. In contrast to this, the tone in itself is “outer.” If we consider that the word “inner” is used synonymously with the word “spiritual,” listeners should transfer the listened to tones into the inside—listening into the internal and spiritual of the composer.

Thus, it turns out that Kretzschmar and Schenker use the words “inner” and “outer” in different ways. For Kretzschmar, the tones in themselves are outer and the human spirituality drawn from them is inner. On the other hand, when Schenker uses the word “inner,” he means intramusical. This difference coincides with the distinction between the “intramusical” structural analysis and the “extramusical” hermeneutic approach in the later period.

However, it must not be overlooked that Kretzschmar, like Schenker, linked the tones with the human life.

One [listener] can determine the affects and, at the same time, it is what he has to do at the very least. Only he who thinks that music is merely music, that is, abandons the connection with the human spiritual life (ihr Zusammenhang mit dem Geistesleben der Menschheit) can escape from the duty to progress hither (AH, 174) [9].

Kretzschmar asserts that only he who has the ability to relate music with the human spiritual life can work out this inner listening. This statement overlaps with Schenker’s concept of “a full consonance with our psychic life,” cited in the first section, in that both assume the connection between music and human spiritual life. In the case of Schenker, the “consonance” of the tonal
world and the human life becomes the assumption on which his own hermeneutics is based, while Kretzschmar puts the connotation of the “connection” with the human life into the term “affects.”[10]

The comparison between the tones and the life found in both Kretzschmar and Schenker is quite important from the standpoint of this paper. For this connection leads us to re-examine the prevailing contrast in the perspective that views the former as “hermeneutics” and the latter as “theory-based analysis.” The difference in the terminology related to “inner” and “outer” could bring out the difference between them within the framework of hermeneutics. In order to deepen our examination in this respect, we will now employ Dilthey’s concept of hermeneutics. If we consider this paper’s conclusion in advance, Kretzschmar’s as well as Schenker’s hermeneutics show a certain affinity to Dilthey’s hermeneutics in each way: the difference between the thoughts of both theorists corresponds to the difference between Dilthey’s general hermeneutics and musical hermeneutics.

4. General Hermeneutics and Musical Hermeneutics: A Comparison to Dilthey

The possibility that Kretzschmar’s musical hermeneutics depended on Dilthey’s hermeneutics has often been pointed out because Kretzschmar and Dilthey both taught Friedrich Wilhelm University[11] at the same time. Nevertheless, many scholars have raised doubts about to what extent Kretzschmar was based on Dilthey in a practical sense[12]. In my opinion, regarding the scheme by which one “understands” the inside on the basis of its external signs, that is, the terminology of the inside as well as their superficial vocabulary, it is certain that Kretzschmar’s concept accords with Dilthey’s concept of general hermeneutics. For instance, the practice of hermeneutics that Dilthey took over from Friedrich Schleiermacher is divided into the grammatical interpretation and the psychological interpretation, as follows:

**Dilthey’s Hermeneutics:**

Grammatical interpretation proceeds through the text from connection to connection up to the highest relations that dominate the whole. Psychological interpretation starts by projecting into the creative inner process (innerer Vorgang), and proceeds onward to the outer and inner form of the work, and beyond that to grasp the unity of an author’s works in relation to his development and spiritual tendencies. (EH, 331; 250 [English translation])

The dichotomy between the grammatical interpretation and the psychological life and the distinction between the outer process and the inner process in hermeneutics as a human science are also observed in Kretzschmar’s musical hermeneutics, as seen in the criticism of Sylva and van Bruyck. To be specific, one can recognize this division fully in the criticism against Sylva, whose grammatical interpretation is not enough, and in the criticism against van Bruyck, who pursues an inner and a psychological interpretation.

This classification is based on Dilthey’s prescription that the given signs are external and that to recognize the inside of them is to understand. This requirement appears in the sentence “Understanding is what we call this process by which an inside is conferred on a complex of
external sensory signs” (EH, 845; 236 [English translation]) in “Hermeneutics” in 1900. That is, Dilthey and Kretzschmar coincide in that they aim to understand external signs and an inside that is separate from them. In the background of this distinction was Dilthey’s intention to proclaim a human science that establishes the “understanding” and “interpreting” of an inside as its mission, as opposed to the natural sciences that explain (erklären) external phenomena exclusively[13]. Moreover, some of Kretzschmar’s vocabulary seems to be derived from Dilthey’s general hermeneutics. For example, Dilthey’s wording “[to] express something spiritual (der Ausdruck eines Geistigen)” (VP, 205; 226 [English translation]) coincides verbally with the abovementioned description by Kretzschmar: “What should be expressed is something spiritual”[14].

While the relationship between Kretzschmar and Dilthey has been discussed up to this point, it would also be possible to show the similarity between Dilthey’s later thoughts and Schenker’s musical thoughts. In fact, a resonance can be seen in the later Dilthey, especially in the manuscript titled “The Musical Understanding (MH),” probably written around 1906, and Schenker’s “true hermeneutics.”

In Dilthey’s “The Musical Understanding,” something different from his general hermeneutics is unfolded, as to the relationship between “music” and “life,” and between the “outer expression” and the “expressed internal.” The peculiarity in Dilthey’s thought about music has long been observed in fields outside musicology. For example, F. Rodi, a scholar of Dilthey, sees a paradigm shift in “The Musical Understanding” that influences the entire thought of Dilthey. Rodi pays attention to Dilthey’s musical thought as a factor in explaining why the dichotomy of “lived experience-expression (Erlebnis-Ausdruck)” in “Studies toward the Foundation of the Human Sciences” in 1905 switched to the framework of the “expression of lived experience (Erlebnisausdruck),” in which lived experience and expression are unified internally in “The Formation of the Historical World in the Human Sciences” 1910 [15].

Then, how does such a new concept appear in “The Musical Understanding”? We shall follow Dilthey’s description of his thinking:

The object of the historical study of music is not some mental or psychic process behind the composition, but something objective, namely, the tonal nexus that appears in the imagination as expression (Tonzusammenhang als Ausdruck). . . . Not psychological, but musical relationships form the object of the study of musical genius, works, and theory. (MV, 221-222; 242-243 [English translation])

Note that the object to study becomes the context of tones as expression. For Kretzschmar, the studied object is the spiritual and inner affects, namely, to “transpose what was listened to into the psychic and spiritual”; in other words, which should be expressed in tones. This must be different from Dilthey’s context of tones in itself. Moreover, what Dilthey intended for the context of tones also conflicts with Dilthey’s own general hermeneutics. For to understand Dilthey’s general hermeneutics, it is necessary in the first place to recognize an inside and a spiritual that are expressed through the outer manifestations. However, in “The Musical Understanding,” the former, what is expressed seems at first glance to be excluded. It is not
excluded, but it could be said that the relationship between this “expression” and “what is
expressed” changes through the unification of lived experience and expression (as we shall see
later), and as a result, expression and what is expressed become unified.

Dilthey’s depiction, according to which, in instrumental music, life appears in its highest
form, must be also convincing for Schenker:

Instrumental music has no determinate object, but one that is infinite, i.e., indeterminate
(ein unbestimmter Gegenstand). Such an object is provided only by life itself (das Leben
selbst). Thus in its highest forms, instrumental music has life itself as its object. A musical
genius such as Bach is inspired by each sound in nature, by each gesture, even by
indeterminate noises, to create corresponding musical forms—moving themes, as it were,
that have the attribute of speaking about life in general terms. (MV, 224; 245 [English
translation]) [16]

In music, the context of tones, to further “life in itself” in its highest form, should be the object.
This statement is based on the unification of lived experience and music. Namely “There is no
duality of lived experience and music, no double world, no carryover from one to the other.
Genius is simply living in the tonal sphere (das Leben in der Tonsphäre) as if it alone existed”
(MV, 222; 242 [English translation]). This view that the genial composer is a life in the tonal
world is similar to the indivisibility between the tonal world and the world of life, as seen in
Schenker’s utterances: “if it occurred inside the tones, two worlds, the world of life and the
tonal world, flew for him without losing their characters for each other” as well as “in the
progressions the composer lives his own life like the life of the progressions.”

If music is different from the general hermeneutics, then how can lived experience and
expression, the life of composer and music, be identical in music? Here is the difference in
quality between poetry and music. For example, Dilthey’s statement that “The idea is as an
unconscious nexus that is operative in the organization of the whole and on the basis of which
inner form is understood” (ZH, 335; 255 [English translation]) explains the interpretive
method of poetic works. For Dilthey, the “idea (Idee)” that the interpreter has to extract here does not
exist as what one has to understand in purely instrumental music. In instrumental music,
instead of the ideas, “the dynamic relationship (das dynamische Verhältnis)” becomes what
has to be extracted:

   every relationship to a musical work . . . deals with something objective. . . . It moves
   imperceptibly in the obscurity of the psyche, and the dynamic relationship that existed in
   these depths is first expressed in the work. (MV, 222-223; 243 [English translation])

In short, in the context of dynamic relationship, the dynamic relationship of tones in itself
becomes “significant (bedeutsam)” and the ideas are unnecessary. Then, in this article, how is
the relationship between “the expressed inner” and “the expressed outer” grasped? If the
expressed lived experience and the expression are inseparable, would Dilthey’s understanding
of music also belong to the framework of the “inner musical life” as Schenker presented it?
Such thinking about music as making lived experience and expression belong together within a single world like Dilthey's is not observed in Kretzschmar's musical hermeneutics. As a consequence, Kretzschmar's concept of “an inside” is compatible not with the concept in Dilthey's musical hermeneutics in particular but one in the general hermeneutics; however, for Dilthey, the musical hermeneutics is different from his general hermeneutics. In the interpretation of music, which differs from verbal expression, its object is the dynamic relationship as the intramusical life. As a result, the term “an inside,” as used in Dilthey's musical hermeneutics in particular and in Schenker's true hermeneutics, becomes identical.

Conclusion

Dilthey's thought in “The Musical Understanding” can be characterized by his unique approach to “the expressed internal” and “the expressing external.” Through the unification of lived experience and expression in which the composer is incorporated into musical works, the distinction between the human internal and the human external does not function any more, and the context inside a musical work becomes an object. In consequence, the elucidation of the “dynamic relationship” in which life is expressed internally becomes a task. In addition, to engage in the intramusical context is Schenker's true hermeneutics, differentiated from Kretzschmar's “human-internal” one. Thus, we have portrayed two modes of hermeneutics, that is, Kretzschmar's musical hermeneutics and Dilthey's or Schenker's hermeneutics. The antagonistic discussions in those days about what the content of music represented, which this paper has examined, could have been because of the differences in the natures of the general hermeneutics and the musical hermeneutics in particular. Yet, it also becomes clear that both types of hermeneutics, competing with each other, share the concept of connection between the human life and the tones to some degree.

Schenker attempted to give an account of the life of tone and later chose a means of analysis (the so-called “Schenkerian graph”) that did not employ verbal ideas. In his later years, under the framework of the “Ursatz,” he represented the dynamic relationship in musical works by the universal matrix of a graph. This graphic representation of the life of tone established in his last period, after it had been introduced into the positivistic academic world in postwar America, had been reinforced merely as the static and objective structuralism inside musical works, while its original connotation of the human life had been abridged. Following this, the musical “hermeneutics” that could unify the human life and the tones inside music, which Schenker himself tried to realize, metamorphosed into the formalistic “analysis” that engages exclusively with the intramusical structure. Yet, when the hermeneutic approach, popular since the 1980s, emerges against such an inner structuralism and tries to turn our attention to the “outside” of the works and to interpret context and ideology outside them actively, there exists the terminology of the inside and outside of music (structure) that Schenker relied on. In the sense of “intramusical” interpretation, with or without the connotation of the human spiritual life, one could understand Schenker's “hermeneutics” and Schenkerian “analysis” on the same plane.

This paper has examined the difference in the usage of the term “inner” and has focused,
as examples, on Kretzschmar’s and Schenker’s hermeneutics linked to Dilthey’s hermeneutics. Through this discussion, one can discover a context that has never been observed from the perspective of hermeneutics and analysis: hermeneutic thinking particular to music in Schenker’s discourse. In conclusion, we should continue to shed new light on Schenker’s interpretation of musical works by reflecting on his vocabulary.

Abbreviations


Notes

[1] In general, Schenkerian theory views musical works as those which are derived from the
archetype called “Ursatz.” The analytic procedure is reductionistic: one extracts structurally important notes from all notes on the score, step-by-step through several layers.


[3] In America since the 1980s, as the criticism against formalistic analysis has arisen, the conflict between hermeneutic interpretation and formalistic analysis in the German-speaking world since the 19th century has been studied from various perspectives. Cf. S. Burnham, “The Criticism of Analysis and the Analysis of Criticism,” 19th-Century Music 16/1 (1991), 70-76; B. Hoeckner, Programming the Absolute: Nineteenth-Century German Music and the Hermeneutics of the Moment (Princeton: Princeton University Press), 2002.


[5] On the other hand, “interpretation” in music also means “performance,” but Snarrenberg defines it here as an understanding of musical works or behaviors in listening to them.

[6] “In the field of music, it is particularly difficult to distinguish strictly among ‘hermeneutics,’ ‘analysis,’ and ‘interpretation.’ As long as one grasped the concept of analysis in a narrow sense, which focuses exclusively on form and structure, hermeneutic understandings were fixed and refined in the perspective of the interpretation of content. The dichotomy of analysis and interpretation has long been deemed as anachronistic.” S. Mauser, “Hermeneutik,” Die Musik in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Allgemeine Enzyklopädie der Musik, Band 4, (Kassel: Bärenreiter, 1996), 262.

[7] Kretzschmar’s affects are different from those in the Baroque period. The latter indicates only individual “emotions,” and they are never contextualized in the nexus of a work as a whole. In contrast, the former, as seen in Kretzschmar’s passages and also in his analysis of Bach’s Fugue in C major, in his essay published in 1905, is considered as a “spiritual feeling of tone (geistige Tonempfindung)” to interpret the “whole” process of a work. Here like the musical content that Schenker defines, spirituality is secured.

[8] For example, J. Kerman, whom Agawu regards as representative of the hermeneutic approach, states: “Analysis sets out to discern and demonstrate the functional coherence of individual works of art, their ‘organic unity,’ as is often said, and that is one of the things . . . that people outside of music mean by criticism” (J. Kerman, “How We Got into Analysis, and How to Get Out,” Critical Inquiry 7/2 (1980), 312). In this way, when Kerman criticizes intramusical structural analysis, he depends on the criterion of “intramusical” and “extramusical.”

[9] By the way, Kretzschmar uses both Seeelenleben and Geistesleben, and these words are not clearly distinguished by Kretzschmar. However, for Dilthey, as discussed later, there is a great difference between “soul (Seele)” and “spirit (Geist).”

[10] If Kretzschmar’s affects are to be drawn from tones, one could also regard his affects as ones “in the tones.” But, if we lay stress on the fact that Kretzschmar described the relation between the tones and the spiritual life only as a “connection,” he must be distinguished carefully from Schenker, who sought the unification of both.

[11] Yet, it is not clear whether there was direct contact between Kretzschmar and Dilthey. On the other hand, Schenker apparently never mentioned Dilthey.

[12] For instance, A. Nowak observes “What Dilthey kept in mind in his unfinished ‘The Phantasy of the Poetic (Die Einbildungskraft des Dichters),’ was to discern the psychological laws in the poetic creation, but not to describe it as a process of affects,” and he points out the gap between Dilthey’s hermeneutics and Kretzschmar’s musical hermeneutics based on affects. Furthermore, Nowak states that Kretzschmar’s hypothesis that in music, there is a psychological relationship between the psychic states and their expression is incompatible with the later Dilthey (A. Nowak, “Dilthey und die musikalische Hermeneutik,” Beiträge zur musikalischen Hermeneutik, edited by
C. Dahlhaus (Regensburg: Gustav Bosse, 1975), 16. And Mauser, referring to the affinity between Kretzschmar und Dilthey regarding the concept of lived experience, argues that Kretzschmar related the concept of lived experience with “too narrow Affektelehre to be deciphered semantically” (S. Mauser, “Zu den philosophischen Grundlagen des Kretzschmarschen Hermeneutikbegriffs,” Hermann Kretzschmar. Konferenzbericht Olbernhau 1998, edited by H. Loos and R. Cadenbach (Chemnitz: Gudrun Schröder Verlag, 1998), 128). In general, scholars have pointed out that Kretzschmar understood Dilthey’s intention of human science in terms that are too narrow. As another example of the gap between both, one can also enumerate the differences in terminology. See note 9.

[13] In the process of this understanding, the procedure of “transposing oneself (Sichhineinversetzen),” namely “transfer of one’s self into a given complex of manifestations of life” (VP, 214; 235 [English translation]) is employed. There is a scholar who assumes that this term is translated as “listen into (hineinhören)” by Kretzschmar. Cf. L. Rothfarb, “Hermeneutics and Energetics: Analytical Alternatives in the Early 1900s,” Journal of Music Theory 36/1 (1992), 43-68.

[14] From the manuscript titled “The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Manifestations of Life” in ca. 1910.


[16] The facts that Dilthey himself played the piano and had contact with Clara Schumann and Johannes Brahms and underestimated Richard Wagner might have had no small effect on such thought about instrumental music as absolute music.

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