A Provocative Approach to the 'Anthropology of Art', with reference to C. S. Peirce

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Introduction

Alfred Gell, a British anthropologist who passed away in 1997, proposes the theory of the 'anthropology of art' in his posthumously published book *Art and Agency*[1] (hereinafter *AA*), and he refers to Charles S. Peirce's concepts such as index and abduction in explaining his 'anthropology of art'. This paper will consider both Gell's theory and Peirce's thought, and argue that although Gell's understanding of Peirce's thought does not necessarily seem appropriate, Gell's 'anthropology of art' suggests thought-provoking views about agencies regarding artistic activities. Furthermore, this paper will suggest a contemporary applicability of Peirce's thought, which is independent of Gell's theory.

The first section describes the outline of Gell's 'anthropology of art'. In the second section, his concepts of 'agency' and 'index' are examined, and then, these concepts are applied to a couple of example cases. The third section focuses on Gell's concept of the 'extended mind'. The fourth section speculates on the potential impact of the 'extended mind' and examines Peirce's concept of index. As a conclusion to this paper, a blueprint that can be developed from both Peirce's semiotics and Gell's 'anthropology of art' will be suggested.

1. Anthropology of Art

In *AA*, Gell comprehensively argues his theory of 'anthropology of art'. According to this theory, the 'anthropology of art' examines "the social context of art production, circulation, and reception" (*AA*, p.3). Moreover, the objects of this study (in his word, 'art objects') do not have to be so-called fine arts; for example, Gell refers to Hindu idol icons and Maori meeting houses as examples of 'art objects'. Thus, the art theory Gell suggests via the 'anthropology of art' is based on social-scientific study approach (just like anthropology) and covers almost all kinds of artefacts.

Fig.1 Asmat shield (cited from *AA*, p.xxiv)

Gell repudiates the following definitions of art objects: that either art objects are sign-vehicles, conveying 'meaning', or they are objects made in order to provoke a culturally endorsed aesthetic response, or that they are both of these simultaneously (*AA*, p.5).[2] To refute these definitions, Gell takes an example of an Asmat shield (Fig.1), and wonders if the aesthetic design on this shield attracts warriors on a battlefield. His answer is, of course, no. This design should rather be regarded as aiming to intimidate enemies. Gell states that "[a]nthropologicaly, it is not a 'beautiful' shield,

but a fear-inducing shield" (*AA*, p.6). This means that art objects such as Asmat shields are not always made with the aim of provoking an aesthetic response. He thus repudiates the definition of art objects mentioned above, and establishes his art theory focusing on actions in the following way:

> I view art as a system of action, intended to change the world rather than encode symbolic propositions about it. The 'action'-centred approach to art is inherently more anthropological than the alternative semiotic approach because it is preoccupied with the practical mediatory role of art objects in the social process, rather than with the interpretation of objects 'as if' they were texts. (*AA*, p.6)

Moreover, based on this 'action'-centred approach, Gell redefines his 'anthropology of art' as a study about the "social relations in the vicinity of objects mediating social agency" (*AA*, p.7). The concept of 'agency' mentioned here clearly illustrates his distinct attitude, namely, his 'action'-centred attitude towards art objects.

2. Agency and Index

This section examines two essential concepts of the 'anthropology of art': agency and index. Gell explains the concept of agency in the following way:

> Agency is attributable to those persons (and things, see below) who/which are seen as initiating causal sequences of a particular type, that is, events caused by acts of mind or will or intention, rather than the mere concatenation of physical events. (*AA*, p.16)

An Asmat shield, as we have seen above, has an active function of intimidating enemies. This function can be considered as deriving from the shield maker's intention to intimidate the enemies. If so, the agency of the shield can be attributed to the craftsman. However, it is not so easy to tell to whom (or what) this agency should be attributed, because it is possible that a person who has requested the craftsman to make it has an intention to intimidate the enemies, thus the shield having the function; considering in this way, the agency might be attributed to the requester. The attribution of agency is not stable, but varies by viewpoints.

It should also be remarked that agency can be attributed to not only humans but also non-human things. Gell takes an example of a statue of Shiva, a Hindu god, and explains how agency is attributed to this statue (*AA*, pp.122-6). His explanation is as follows: even when a mouse runs over a statue of Shiva, Shiva does not move at all; according to Hindu theology, however, the Shiva statue can be thought of as sacrificing its freedom of movement, and thus providing its worshippers with divine benefits; therefore it intentionally stands still even when a mouse is running on it, and in this sense, agency can be attributed to a statue of Shiva. Gell thus concludes that agency can be attributed to things.

The concept of index is as essential as agency in Gell's theory. To understand the significance of index, the background reason why Gell needs this concept should be noted. As explained in

the previous section, the 'anthropology of art' is based on 'action'-centred approach, and this study analyses "social relations in the vicinity of objects mediating social agency" (*AA*, p.7). Accordingly, each object needs to be considered in a context of social relations.[3] To illustrate how art objects are considered in such a way, Gell suggests a way to understand art as analogous to religious activities; theatres, libraries, and galleries can be regarded as shrines, and artists are priests; art critics are theologians, and the religious doctrine of art is pursuit of the universal beauty.[4] Moreover, Gell contends that when art objects are anthropologically examined, researchers should be philistine-like in the same way that anthropologists are atheistic when they conduct research about a foreign religious system.[5] Even though the 'anthropology of art' examines 'art objects', 'art objects' should not be understood as aesthetic objects but as neutral objects; thus, the term 'index', which is free from aesthetic implication, is introduced to stand for them.

The concept of index is introduced from C.S. Peirce's semiotics, and it originally means a sign which represents an object by virtue of a physical connection; for example, according to Peirce, a weathercock is an index because it physically veers with the wind to stand for the direction of the wind.[6] However, Gell's use of the concept of index seems different from Peirce's. Gell states "the index is itself seen as the outcome, and/or the instrument of, social agency" (*AA*, p.15); in Gell's theory, for example, smoke might be regarded as "the index of fire-setting by human agents (burning swiddens, say)"(*ibid.*). Peirce would explain the same smoke in the following way: a fire is burning a bush or something and this causes the smoke according to a physical law of burning, so this smoke can be regarded as an index of a burning fire. Although both of Peirce and Gell are focusing on 'action', Peirce's index is focusing on physical actions between an index and its object, whilst Gell's index can refer to social actions generated by human agents as well; here is a huge leap from Peirce's index to Gell's index.

In order to understand the concept of (Gell's) index, another concept Gell borrows from Peirce should also be remarked on: abduction. According to Peirce, abduction is an inferential process as follows. A surprising circumstance C is observed, but if A is true C is explicable, so then there is a reason for considering A as true.[7] This inferential process in which A is inferred from C is, of course, not yet reliable; abduction offers only a hypothesis, and this hypothesis needs to be confirmed by other inferential processes, namely, induction and deduction.[8] However, it should also be remarked that abductive reasoning could become habitual as the same abductions are repeated in similar situations and abducted hypotheses are confirmed by virtue of induction and deduction. The concept of 'habit' is the core of Peirce's thought, and therefore the process of abduction is important as the beginning of making habits.[9] With these backgrounds kept in mind, Gell's concept of index will now be examined.

Gell argues that indexes mediate agencies through the process of abduction, and he takes an example of a smile which could mean friendliness: it is highly likely that those who look at a portrait of a smiling person will consider as showing friendliness the person in the portrait, the sitting model of the portrait, or the 'subject', which is Gell's expression, of the portrait; thus, not only actual people's minds, but also the minds of people in paintings can be inferred from indexes (*AA*, p.15). Gell generalises this consideration as follows:

> [T]he means we generally have to form a notion of the disposition and intentions of 'social others' is via a large number of abductions from indexes [...]. (*ibid.*)

According to this view, it is clear that the 'anthropology of art' can be understood as a study about indexes which mediate agencies of 'social others' via abductions.

Two concepts explained above, namely, agency and index are key concepts of the 'anthropology of art'. The remaining part of this section shows how these concepts work and the 'anthropology of art' functions in practice.

At the outset, it may be helpful to introduce more a few terms. Gell designates as an 'agent' an object to which agency is attributed, and an object which receives agency is called a 'patient'. In addition, Gell argues that four kinds of objects should be introduced into the 'anthropology of art': Index, Artist,[10] Prototype, and Recipient. Each of these four can be either an agent or a patient. Even when considering one pair of an agent and a patient, there may be four-multiplied-by-four possible cases, namely, sixteen possible cases of agent/patient relations among this pair: these relations are social relations the 'anthropology of art' aims to examine. It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine all the permutations; taking just two typical cases would meet the aim of this paper.

The first example case of social agent/patient relations can be expressed in the following way.

(A): [[Prototype] → Artist] → Index] ⟶ Recipient [11]

Regardless of the length of arrows, each of them expresses the relationship between two objects. An object put in a position previous to an arrow is understood as an agent, whilst an object after an arrow is a patient. A long arrow means the relationship between an index as an agent and the direct patient of this agent (called the 'primary' patient). It can also be noticed that within each bracket an agent/patient relation is established; an Artist, who is a patient of the agency of a Prototype, exerts his or her agency on an Index, and in turn, this Index, which inherits the background of the Artist and the Prototype, exerts its agency on the 'primary' patients, namely, its Recipients.

It is Joshua Reynolds's portrait of Samuel Johnson that Gell takes as an example of the case (A). In this example, an actual person, Samuel Johnson, is a Prototype, and Reynolds is an Artist; the portrait is an Index, and viewers of it are Recipients. Johnson is a sitting model for this portrait, so his appearance dominates how Reynolds paints; a Prototype (Johnson) can be regarded as exerting his agency on an Artist (Reynolds). On the other hand, it is Reynolds who paints the portrait; an Artist exerts his or her agency on an Index. In turn, this portrait could cause in viewers' mind, for example, an admiration for Johnson as a great lexicographer; an Index exerts its agency on Recipients.

On the other hand, according to Gell, this explanation is not the case of the *Mona Lisa* by Leonardo da Vinci, although it is also a portrait. The social agent/patient relations about the case of the *Mona Lisa* can be expressed in the following way.

(B): [[[Artist] → Prototype] → Index] ⟶ Recipient [12]

Gell contends that "the features, or some semblance of the features, once possessed by the woman referred to in Leonardo's picture, are significant only in so far as they mediate our awareness Leonardo's art as a painter" (*AA*, p.52); in the case of the *Mona Lisa*, an Artist is Leonardo, who is expressing his art, and this "Leonardo's art" may be regarded as a Prototype. An Index is the painting itself, and viewers are Recipients. Comparing this second example with the first one, from Gell's view, the agent/patient relation between an Artist and a Prototype seems to be reversed. However, the case of the *Mona Lisa* can be analysed in the same way as the first example; the sitting model for the *Mona Lisa* (assumed to be Lisa del Giocondo) can be considered as exerting her agency on the Artist, Leonardo. It is rather important to notice that Gell's explanation of social agent/patient relations is flexible, and can describe various kinds of series of such relations.[13]

These successive series of agent/patient relations can be infinitely prolonged; for example, they can be prolonged to describe a process of an artist's work affecting other artists' works, or a process of a cultural tradition being established and inherited from generation to generation; or the whole life and the whole of works of an artist can be analysed by using this series of relations. From this idea, Gell suggests a unique view about the concept of mind. The next section will examine his idea of the 'extended mind'.

3. Gell's Extended Mind

Gell gives the title of "The Extended Mind" to the last chapter of *AA*. Although this title might recall a famous idea of the philosophy of mind, which was proposed by Clark and Chalmers[14] and has been the subject of much discussion among philosophers, Gell does not refer to this extended mind. Gell's idea of the 'extended mind' is well expressed in the following suggestion:

> Especially if, as I shall be doing, we consider 'persons' not as bounded biological organisms, but use this label to apply to all the objects and/or events in the milieu from which agency or personhood can be abducted. (*AA*, p.222)

Gell puts forward this suggestion to argue that "a person and a parson's mind are not confined to particular spatio-temporal coordinates, but consist of a spread of biographical events and memories of events" (*ibid.*). Accordingly, each person and her mind can be considered as consisting of her biographical backgrounds. Moreover, material objects that testify the backgrounds of this person, such as her relics or the artefacts she makes, can be construed as her indexes. Consequently, Gell proposes a particular understanding of the concept of person; "[t]he person is thus understood as the sum total of the indexes which testify, in life and subsequently, to the biographical existence of this or that individual" (*AA*, p.222-3). Therefore, in Gell's theory, the concept of person's mind can be extended even to such indexes; this is Gell's idea of the 'extended mind'. An agency of a person would be mediated via numerous indexes, and Gell calls each of them a "distributed object" (*AA*, p.223). He believes this agency can be regarded as

distributed to each index because the distributions of the agency can be found in each index. Thus, the 'extended mind' can also be extended to a collective series of indexes.

The concept of the 'extended mind' is closely related to the idea of successive series of agent/patient relations, which has been examined in the previous section. For example, assume that artworks of an artist X make an impact on new artworks of another artist Y: it is arguable that even in Y's works X's agency is observable and that Y's works are also indexes of X; consequently, the biological backgrounds of X are continually updated. In the same way, the whole life of an artist Z can be understood as a series of agent/patient relations among indexes of Z such as her works and her belongings; the agency of Z is distributed to each index of Z and her mind can be extended to all the indexes.

Gell proposes a particular example regarding the 'extended mind': the Maori meeting house (Fig. 2).[15] From the latter half of the 19th century, the Maori people began to compete with each other by constructing meeting houses, instead of resorting to warlike means. Each Maori community builds a huge meeting house and elaborately decorates its exterior and interior with traditional carving and painting; Each meeting house expresses "the wealth, sophistication, technical skill, and ancestral endowment" (*AA*, p.251) of each community. Gell argues that the meeting house illustrates the collective agency of its community for three reasons. Firstly, this is simply because people collect in the house. Secondly, this is because the meeting house consists of a number of artefacts and can be understood as an organic artefact as a whole, which expresses the historical backgrounds of the community. Then, the third reason is the most important. Gell states this as follows:

> The house is a body *for* the body. Houses are bodies because they are containers which, like the body, have entrances and exits. Houses are cavities filled with living contents. Houses are bodies because they have strong bones and armoured shells, [...]. To enter a house is to enter a mind, a sensibility; [...]. Like many traditional psychologists, the Maori located mind and intention in the viscera. To enter a house is to enter the belly of ancestor and to be overwhelmed by the encompassing ancestral presence; [...]. (*AA*, pp.252-3. The italicisation is Gell's.)

It is clear that Gell regards a Maori meeting house as a collective index of the community's agency, by likening it to a body; in this body, there is the mind of the community.

Moreover, Gell focuses on the process in which several traditional styles are inherited by other houses and at times affected by other styles, and he compares this process to the process in which an artist develops her style. To put this into a simple example, one traditional style observed in one meeting house can be inherited by and developed in other meeting houses, just as one artistic style observed in one artist's works can be inherited by and developed

Fig.2 Maori meeting house
(cited from *AA*, p.252)

in her later works. This analogy also suggests that each meeting house can be regarded as analogous to a sketch, which is a preparation work for a future masterpiece. The competitive purpose of the Maori meeting house taken into account, each house can be understood as a preparation for the future ultimate meeting house which surpasses all the other meeting houses. The whole process of constructing the ultimate meeting house can also be understood analogously to the whole life of an artist; it is a collective process consisting of successive series of agent/patient relations.

This section has examined Gell's concept of the 'extended mind', and shown that the minds of persons or communities can be considered as extending to the collective indexes such as the whole of one artist's art works and the Maori meeting house. In the next section, this concept will be developed beyond the Gell's scope, with reference to C.S. Peirce's thought.

4. Reconsideration of the 'Anthropology of Art'

This paper has so far examined the 'anthropology of art' based on Gell's argument. It should be noted, however, that the theory of 'anthropology of art' can be further developed by taking into account the comprehensive understanding of Peirce's concept of index.

When discussing the 'extended mind', Gell mentions *homunculi*, *pace* D. C. Dennett.[16] Homunculi are to be understood as conscious entities which dwell in heads of people, interpret the input from the external world, and work out perceptive consciousness in the minds of people. As seen in the second section, Gell contends that agency can be attributed to things such as the statues of gods. He explains that there are two kinds of strategy which allow the statues to have the agency: the externalist strategy and the internalist strategy (*AA*, pp.126-54).[17] The externalist strategy assumes that the social (and inter-subjective) conventions are decisive factors in attribution of agency; for example, when worshippers of a Shiva statue think the statue is intentionally sacrificing its freedom, the agency is attributed to the statue via worshipper's conventional thought. On the other hand, regarding the internalist strategy, Gell mentions homunculi. In the internalist strategy, the statues of gods need to have internal objects to which the agency should finally be attributed. For example, "[s]uppose, instead of drilling 'eye' holes in the spherical idol, we leave it as it is, but place it in a box, an ark" (*AA*, p.133); the stone can be regarded as "the locus of agency" (*ibid.*), and the box can be regarded as the sacred container of the locus of agency. This illustrates a relation similar to the relation between homunculi and a human head. Gell thus relates the concept of homunculi to his argument.

The concept of homunculi cannot avoid the defect of infinite regress; homunculi inside a human head request inside each of them smaller homunculi, which should interpret the input from greater homunculi, and this regression continues for ever. Nevertheless, Gell thinks that the internalist strategy is still viable, and that both the internalist strategy and the externalist strategy are indispensable in his 'anthropology of art'. He argues as follows:

> From the anthropological point of view, if not the philosophical one, the solution to the conflict between the external notion of agency, deriving from insertion in the social milieu, and the 'internalist' theory of agency, deriving from an inner subjective self, is to be sought

> in this 'enchainment', the structural congruence between the inner self (which is relational) and the outer self (which is equally relational, but on an expanded scale). (*AA*, pp.140-1)

Gell thinks that the infinitely nested structure of the inner self and the outer self continues endlessly like the infinite regress of homunculi, but he also thinks that the distinction between the inner self and the outer self is only relative. In mentioning homunculi, Gell intends to point out this particular characteristics observed in the nested structure of an inexhaustible number of the inner and outer selves. Indeed, Gell's concept of the 'extended mind' has the same nested structure. This concept of mind can be construed as extended to a collective index which mediates collective agency of persons and communities. Moreover, it is also arguable that each index has its backgrounds, and these backgrounds consist of numerous previous indexes. Therefore, here can also be observed the infinitely nested structure of the inner and outer indexes.

The question about an Asmat shield mentioned in the second section should be considered again: to whom (or what) should the agency be attributed? The concept of the 'extended mind' suggests that there can be a multi-layered entity to which the agency might be attributed, and this entity is not confined to particular space or time but consists of a collective index and background indexes. When it comes to art, the 'anthropology of art' offers a radical shift of the understanding of artworks: artworks can be understood as a collective index which has an infinitely nested and multi-layered structure.

Now the concept of index needs to be re-examined with reference to Peirce's semiotics. As argued above, it is true that there is a discrepancy between Peirce's index and Gell's index. However, Gell's concept of index can be revised in accord with Peirce's index when the following explanation by Peirce is considered:

> An *index* stands for its object by virtue of a real connection with it, or because it forces the mind to attend to that object. [...] A weathercock is an *indication*, or *index*, of the direction of the wind; because, in the first place, it really takes the selfsame direction of the wind, so that there is a real connection between them, and in the second place, we are so constituted that when we see a weathercock pointing in a certain direction it draws our attention to that direction, and when we see the weathercock veering with the wind, we are forced by the law of mind to think that direction is connected with the wind.[18]

Peirce points out two aspects of the concept of index. The first one has been seen in the second section: an index stands for an object according to physical laws. The second aspect is remarkable here: an index forces its interpreter's mind to connect the index with a real object according to the 'law of mind'. The 'law of mind' could be understood here as a series of mental habits established in a person's mind. To take the example of a weathercock, one observes certain physical phenomena repeatedly and gains scientific knowledge about them. Through these processes, one establishes a series of mental habits, which forces the mind to connect the direction of weathercock with the direction of the wind when one sees a weathercock. An index can thus stand for an object by virtue of mental habits, even though these habits may need to derive from observations of physical phenomena and scientific knowledge.

In the 'anthropology of art', an index is assumed to mediate the agencies of social others via the process of abduction. It has been explained in the second section that in Peirce's philosophy the process of abduction is regarded as the beginning of making habits. These taken into account, Gell's concept of index can be revised as follows: indexes stand for the agencies of social others via abduction, and this abduction leads one to make habits and establish the 'law of mind'. Thus, the connection between the indexes and the agencies is more robustly established. Peirce's index is, however, standing for physical phenomena in the external world, while Gell's index is mediating, or standing for, the social agencies or the minds of others; there is still a huge discrepancy. This paper does not stick to Gell's viewpoint, but speculates on the applicability of the 'anthropology of art' from a Peircean viewpoint.

Peirce's cosmology should be referred to here. Peirce regards the whole universe as a huge collective sign, which continues to evolve.[19] Even the physical laws which control all natural phenomena can be construed as habits established through the evolutional process of the sign(s) of the universe. Moreover, Peirce argues that these physical laws should be regarded as 'real' in the actual world.[20] Thus, indexes stand for real things which are fundamental in the evolving universe, so Peirce's concept of index has great significance in his semiotic cosmology. In other words, indexes can stand for the backgrounds of the evolutional process of the whole universe.

When the 'anthropology of art' is revised with reference to this view, the 'extended mind', which has been explained by taking the example of the evolutional process of Maori meeting houses, can be considered as analogous to the evolutional process of the universe Peirce's cosmology argues for. Therefore, the 'anthropology of art' can be revised to offer insights into the structure of series of not only social agencies of humans but also, for example, agencies of an ecological system of various biological entities and physical substances in the universe. Although this might sound extravagant and it can be extremely difficult to conceive of a concrete example for this idea, it should also be remarked that artistic activities have often been extravagant so far, and it is arguable that they should be so in the future as well.

Conclusion

This paper has examined the 'anthropology of art', and pursued its applicability with reference to Peirce's philosophy. The conclusion to this paper can be stated in terms of following two points. Firstly, Gell's concept of the 'extended mind' has a particular kind of structure: an infinitely nested and multi-layered structure of inner and outer selves. The agency is not confined to particular time or space; it can be attributed to any layer of this structure, or even to the collective whole of the structure. Secondly, Peirce's index is especially significant in his semiotic cosmology, because it stands for the evolutional backgrounds of the whole universe. When Gell's example of Maori meeting houses is understood as analogous to Peirce's idea of the evolving universe, the 'anthropology of art' can be revised to involve not only studies on human social agencies but also agencies of ecological systems of organisms and physical materials.

When it comes to art, artistic activities such as art-creating actions and art-appreciating actions can gain significance as reflective activities which request reconsideration on existing indexes and reconstruct the understanding of collective agencies which are not confined to a

particular time and space. This revision of the 'anthropology of art' suggests to artists, philosophers of art, and art historians that the objects they are dealing with or studying can be reconstructed as the indexes mediating the 'extended mind' which may offer insights into enormous evolving semiotic processes such as an ecological system --- or perhaps the whole universe according to Peirce's semiotics, though I cannot help admitting that this still sounds too extravagant.

Notes

[1] Gell, A. (1998) *Art and Agency: An Anthropological Theory*, Oxford University Press.

[2] Cf. Morphy, H. (1994) "The Anthropology of Art", in T. Ingold (ed.), *Companion Encyclopedia of Anthropology*, Routledge, pp.648-85.

[3] It may be arguable that this stance is similar to George Dickie's institutional theory of art. In "Vogel's Net", Gell mentions the institutional theory as "a sociological theory rather than a truly philosophical one" and argues "the objectionableness of Dickie's theory from the standpoint of traditional aesthetics is precisely what constitutes its appeal to the anthropologist" (Gell, A. (1999) "Vogel's Net", in Eric Hirsch (ed.), *The Art of Anthropology: essays and diagrams*, Athlone, pp.187-214.).

[4] Gell, A. (1992) "The Technology of Enchantment and the Enchantment of Technology", in Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton (ed.), *Anthropology, Art, and Aesthetics*, Oxford University Press.

[5] Gell remarks that Howard Morphy is "understandably disinclined to accept the verdict of the Western art world as to the definition of 'art' beyond the physical frontiers of the West"(*AA*, p.5), even though Gell does not accept Morphy's definition of art. See also Morphy, *op.cit.*

[6] Peirce, C. S. (1998) *Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, vol.2 (1893-1913)*, edited by the Peirce Edition Project, Indiana University Press, p.14. [Reference to this book is designated *EP*2.]

[7] *EP*2, p.231.

[8] See also *EP*2, p.434-50.

[9] See also *EP*2, p.226-41.

[10] Gell suggests that not only creators of fine art but also children drawing in a classroom, and even Mary Richardson, who slashed the Rokeby Venus in the National Gallery in London, can be regarded as 'Artists' in Gell's framework. See *AA*, pp.51-65.

[11] In the original text (*AA*, p.52), this diagram is expressed as follows: [[Prototype-A] ➔Artist-A] ➔ Index-A] ⟶ Recipient-P. A is an abbreviation for agent, and P is for patient. Hyphens and letters after hyphens (A and P) are omitted in this paper for simplicity. Cf. *AA*, p.51.

[12] Cited from *AA*, p.52, although '-A's and '-P's are omitted for simplicity.

[13] Recipients may also be agents; for example, Gell suggests that patrons of certain artists can exercise influence over the artworks. In addition, Gell mentions present-day gallery-goers, and argues "[t]hey do not feel passive; after all, entering a gallery is something they do voluntarily, out of motives which can certainly be attributed to their own social agency."(*AA*, p.34)

[14] Clark, A. and Chalmers, D. (1998) "The Extended Mind", *Analysis,* vol.58, pp.10-23.

[15] Gell refers to Neich, R. (1996) *Painted Histories*, Auckland University.

[16] Gell refers to Dennett, D. C. (1981) "Artificial Intelligence as Philosophy and as Psychology", in *Brainstorms*, MIT Press, pp.109-126.

[17] 'Externalism' and 'Internalism' are often discussed in the field of philosophy of mind. However, Gell does not mention basic articles in this field such as Putnam, H. (1975) "The meaning of 'meaning'", in K. Gunderson (ed.), *Language, Mind, and Knowledge*, University of Minnesota

Press, pp.131-91, or Burge, T. (1979) "Individualism and the mental", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy,* vol.4, pp.73-122. It is therefore uncertain to what extent Gell is aware of implications of words such as 'internalist' and 'externalist' in the context of philosophy of mind.

[18] *EP*2, p.14.

[19] *EP*2, pp.193-4.

[20] One of the most comprehensive explanations of Peirce's concept of reality can be found in *EP*2, pp.177-195.

* This is the English version of my paper in *Bigaku* 64, no.1 (2013), pp.47-58, published by the Japanese Society for Aesthetics.